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ABSTRACT
Alerting systems are becoming pervasive in process operations, which may result in the
potential for dissonance or conflict in information from different alerting systems that
suggests different threat levels and/or actions to resolve hazards. Little is currently
available to help in predicting or solving the dissonance problem. This thesis presents a
methodology to model and analyze dissonance between alerting systems, providing both
a theoretical foundation for understanding dissonance and a practical basis from which
specific problems can be addressed.
A state-space representation of multiple alerting system operation is generalized that can
be tailored across a variety of applications. Based on the representation, two major
causes of dissonance are identified: logic differences and sensor error. Additionally,
several possible types of dissonance are identified.
A mathematical analysis method is developed to identify the conditions for dissonance
originating from logic differences. A probabilistic analysis methodology is developed to
estimate the probability of dissonance originating from sensor error, and to compare the
relative contribution to dissonance of sensor error against the contribution from logic
differences. A hybrid model, which describes the dynamic behavior of the process with
multiple alerting systems, is developed to identify dangerous dissonance space, from
which the process can lead to disaster. Methodologies to avoid or mitigate dissonance are
outlined.
Two examples are used to demonstrate the application of the methodology. First, a
conceptual In-Trail Spacing example is presented. The methodology is applied to
identify the conditions for possible dissonance, to identify relative contribution of logic
difference and sensor error, and to identify dangerous dissonance space. Several
proposed mitigation methods are demonstrated in this example. In the second example,
the methodology is applied to address the dissonance problem between two air traffic
alert and avoidance systems: the existing Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
(TCAS) vs. the proposed Airborne Conflict Management system (ACM). Conditions on
ACM resolution maneuvers are identified to avoid dynamic dissonance between TCAS
and ACM.
Thesis Supervisor: James K. Kuchar
Title: Associate Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
3
4
Table of Contents
LIST OF FIGURES............................................................................7
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................. 11
NOMENCLATURE & DEFINITIONS.......................................................15
ACRONYMS.......................................................................................17
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...................................................................19
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 21
1.1 Problem Statement ......................................................................... 21
1.2 Example Problems ......................................................................... 23
1.3 O bjective ........................................................................................ 29
1.4 Overview of Thesis ......................................................................... 30
2. MODEL OF DISSONANCE BETWEEN MULTIPLE ALERTING SYSTEMS
........................................... .................. .......................... .33
2.1 General Alerting System Background .................................................... 33
2.2 Generalized State-Space Representation of Multiple Alerting Systems ................ 34
2.3 Multiple Alerting Systems Dissonance......................................................40
2.4 Sum m ary ........................................................................................ 46
3. DISSONANCE ORIGINATING FROM LOGIC DIFFERENCES ................ 49
3.1 Formal Description of Threshold Functions ............................................ 49
3.2 Identification of Conditions for Dissonance ............................................ 52
3.3 Dissonance Analysis Due to Process Dynamics........................................ 54
3.4 Sum m ary ........................................................................................ 55
4. DISSONANCE ORIGINATING FROM SENSOR ERROR ......... ...... 57
4.1 Analysis of Dissonance Originating from Sensor Error .............................. 57
4.2 Example Analysis of the Contribution of Sensor Error ................................ 62
5
4.3 Summary ..................................................................................... 66
5. HYBRID SYSTEM ANALYSIS OF CONSEQUENCES OF DISSONANCE .... 67
5.1 Dangerous Dissonance Space ............................................................ 67
5.2 Hybrid Model for the Process Incorporating Multiple Alerting Systems ............... 71
5.3 Identification of Dangerous Dissonance Space ............................................ 77
5.4 Summary ..................................................................................... 79
6. AVOIDING AND/OR MITIGATING DISSONANCE .............................. 81
6.1 Prioritization ................................................................................. 81
6.2 Modify System Design ..................................................................... 84
6.3 Modify Operational Procedures to Avoid Dissonance ................................. 87
6.4 Modify Control Strategy ................................................................... 87
6.5 Modify Procedures Under Dissonance ................................................... 89
6.6 Summary ..................................................................................... 90
7. EXAMPLE APPLICATION: IN-TRAIL SPACING .................................. 93
7.1 Dissonance Originating from Logic Difference ........................................... 94
7.2 Dissonance Originating from Sensor Error ................................................ 101
7.3 Consequences of Dissonance ............................................................... 113
7.4 Ways to Avoid/Mitigate Dissonance ...................................................... 120
7.5 Sum m ary ....................................................................................... 130
8. EXAMPLE APPLICATION: AIR TRAFFIC SEPARATION ..................... 133
8.1 Identification of Conditions for Dissonance .............................................. 135
8.2 Management of Dissonance ................................................................. 144
8.3 Sum m ary ....................................................................................... 148
6
9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS......................................................151
9 .1 S um m ary ....................................................................................... 15 1
9.2 C onclusions .................................................................................... 158
9.3 Recommendations ............................................................................ 159
REFERENCES ................................................................................... 161
7
8
List of Figures
Figure 1.1 Schematic of an Alerting Conflict .............................................. 21
Figure 1.2 Mid-air Collision on July 2nd in Germany .................................. 24
Figure 1.3 Dissonance between AILS and TCAS .......................................... 25
Figure 2.1 Generalized Alerting System Functions ......................................... 34
Figure 2.2 Generalized State-Space Representation of Multiple Alerting Systems ....... 35
Figure 2.3 Different Command Styles ....................................................... 38
Figure 2.4 Command Sequencing ................................................................ 38
Figure 2.5 Indicated Dissonance because of Different Hazard Alert Stages ............... 41
Figure 2.6 Perceived Command Dissonance ................................................ 43
Figure 2.7 Example Perceived Dissonance Due to Process Dynamics (1) .................. 44
Figure 2.8 Example Perceived Dissonance Due to Process Dynamics (2) .................. 44
Figure 2.9 Mapping of Alerting System ..................................................... 45
Figure 2.10 Mapping of Sensor .................................................................. 46
Figure 3.1 Example Predicates and Alert Stages ............................................... 51
Figure 3.2 Example Subsets of Different Commands......................................51
Figure 3.3 Predicates and Alert Stages of System 2 ....................................... 52
Figure 3.4 Example Combinations of Alert Stages ......................................... 53
Figure 3.5 Closed Loop for System Dynamics .............................................. 54
Figure 3.6 Example Analysis of Dissonance due to Process Dynamics.................54
Figure 4.1 The Measurement of a True State ................................................ 57
Figure 4.2 Probability of System 1 Alert ........................................................ 58
Figure 4.3 Probability of System 2 Alert .................................................... 58
Figure 4.4 Probability of System 1 No Alert ................................................ 60
Figure 4.5 Probability of System 2 No Alert ................................................ 60
Figure 4.6 Translate Sensor Error to Threshold Boundary Change ...................... 62
Figure 4.7 Dissonance Space Change with Sensor Errors .................................. 62
Figure 4.8 Considering Different Measurement Update Rate.............................64
Figure 5.1 State Space Representation of Alerting System for Hazard .................. 68
Figure 5.2 Uncertain Operator's Responses in dissonance Space ........................ 69
Figure 5.3 Dangerous Dissonance Space ........................................................ 69
Figure 5.4 Forward Reachability Analysis .................................................. 70
9
Figure 5.5 Backward Reachability Analysis ................................................... 70
Figure 5.6 Transition Functions in Dissonance Space ..................................... 73
Figure 5.7 Example Transition Function ................................................... 75
Figure 5.8 Example Dynamics of the Hybrid Model .......................................... 76
Figure 5.9 Identification of Dangerous Dissonance Space ............................... 78
Figure 6.1 Alert Prioritization (Ververs, 1999) ................................................ 82
Figure 6.2 State-Space Representation of Prioritization ................................... 84
Figure 6.3 Reshape Threshold Functions to Eliminate Dissonance Space .................. 85
Figure 6.4 Reduce Vertical Speed to Avoid Dissonance ................................... 87
Figure 6.5 Restricted Trajectories in dangerous Dissonance Space to Avoid Hazards ... 88
Figure 6.6 Modify Evading Trajectories to Avoid Unsafe Effect of Dissonance .......... 89
Figure 7.1 In-Trail Example ................................................................... 93
Figure 7.2 Example In-Trail Separation Alert Stage Mapping ............................ 96
Figure 7.3 Combined In-Trail Alert Stages ................................................. 97
Figure 7.4 Action Spaces for Alerting Situations .......................................... 98
Figure 7.5 Dynamical Trajectory Analysis .................................................... 100
Figure 7.6 Dynamic Changes in Alerting Actions From Sio to Soi ......................... 101
Figure 7.7 Example Sensor Error Model ...................................................... 102
Figure 7.8 Threshold Boundary Change due to Sensor Error ............................... 103
Figure 7.9 Probability of Dissonance for a True State (K=30ft) ........................... 105
Figure 7.10 Probability of Dissonance for a True State (K=00ft) ........................ 106
Figure 7.11 Effect of Sensor Accuracy on Probability of Dissonance for a true State.... 106
Figure 7.12 True State Trajectory with measurement Update Rate 0.25s ................. 108
Figure 7.13 Probability of Dissonance along Example Trajectory ......................... 108
Figure 7.14 Set of Uncertain True State Trajectories without Sensor Error ............... 109
Figure 7.15 Set of Uncertain True State Trajectories with K=30ft.........................110
Figure 7.16 Overall Effect of Standard deviation on P. (DI Ti)...........................111
Figure 7.17 Contribution of Sensor Error to Dissonance .................................... 112
Figure 7.18 Sensor Error Benefit of Dissonance ............................................. 113
Figure 7.19 Dynamics of the In-Trail Process ................................................ 116
Figure 7.20 Example Process Dynamics ...................................................... 117
Figure 7.21 Dangerous Dissonance Space .................................................... 118
10
Figure 7.22 Avoid Dissonance through Prioritizing System 2 .............................. 120
Figure 7.23 Modify System Design to Reduce the Potential for Dissonance ............. 121
Figure 7.24 The Area of Dissonance Space ................................................... 123
Figure 7.25 Optimal Alerting Thresholds ...................................................... 124
Figure 7.26 Change the Shape of Threshold Function to Avoid Dissonance ............. 126
Figure 7.27 Required Acceleration to Avoid Entering Dangerous Dissonance Space ... 128
Figure 7.28 Change Operational Procedure to Avoid Dissonance ......................... 129
Figure 8.1 Horizontal Plan Kinematics ......................................................... 136
Figure 8.2 Example TCAS Threshold Function and Alert Stages .......................... 139
Figure 8.3 Example ACM Threshold Function and Alert Stages ........................... 140
Figure 8.4 Example TCAS and ACM Thresholds ........................................... 141
Figure 8.5 TCAS and ACM Thresholds During Avoidance Maneuver ................... 144
Figure 8.6 ACM Maneuver Model ............................................................ 145
Figure 8.7 Effect of PAZ Avoidance Maneuver on TCAS Alert States .................. 146
Figure 8.8 Effect of CAZ Avoidance Maneuver on TCAS Alert status .................. 147
11
12
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Number of Warnings on Aircraft (Hawkins, 1987) ............................ 23
Table 2.1 Alerting Systems Indicated Dissonance Types ..................................... 40
Table 7.1 Alerting system Threshold Parameters ............................................. 105
Table 7.2 Governing Vector Field and Possible Acceleration on Four Subsets .......... 114
Table 7.3 Threshold Parameters for the Example Process Dynamics ..................... 117
Table 7.4 The Optimal Thresholds..............................................................125
Table 7.4 Comparison of Mitigation Methods ................................................ 131
Table 8.1 Vertical Maneuver Requirements to Avoid TCAS Alerts ...................... 148
13
14
Definitions
Alert Stage
Dangerous Dissonance Space
Dangerous Dissonance State
Dissonance Space
False Dissonance
Hazard Alert Stage
Indicated Dissonance
Missed Dissonance
Perceived Dissonance:
Resolution Command
System Alert Stage
A discrete categorization of the level of danger and
urgency of the threat according to alerting system.
A subset of dissonance space from which the
process can lead to hazard space, equal to the union
of all dangerous dissonance states.
A state within dissonance space from which the
process can lead to hazard space.
A region in state space where perceived dissonance
is present.
Dissonance triggered by a measured state whose
true state is outside dissonance space.
A discrete categorization of the level of threat posed
by a given hazard under observation by a alerting
system.
A mismatch of information (different alert stages or
different resolution commands) between alerting
systems.
Dissonance not triggered by a measured state whose
true state is inside dissonance space.
A situation in which information from two or more
alerting systems have content and representations
that suggest different timing of alerts and actions to
resolve a hazard.
The type of resolution action to be performed and
the magnitude of that maneuver given by alerting
system based on the alert stage and other
information on the situation.
The resultant level of threat posed by all the hazards
under observation by a alerting system, equal to the
maximum of all individual hazard alert stages.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
Automated alerting systems are becoming increasingly pervasive in time-critical
and/or safety-critical operations, with applications spanning aerospace vehicles,
automobiles, chemical and power control stations, air traffic control, and medical
monitoring systems. As these applications are pushed toward higher safety and
capability, new alerting systems have been introduced to provide additional protection
from hazards. Accordingly, there has generally been an evolutionary, incremental
addition of alerting systems to these applications over time. Because it is costly to
completely redesign and recertify automation, new alerting systems are typically
independent enhancements that do not directly affect the operation of existing
subsystems.
The addition of multiple alerting systems to an already complex operation carries
several liabilities (Prichett, et al., 2002). First, there is an increase in the amount of
information processing required by the human operator, who now must be trained and
able to respond rapidly to more information. There is also a potential for simultaneous
alerts from the different systems, possibly overloading or confusing the human. This is a
classic human factors challenge found in many work environments (Momtahan, et al.,
1993; Carrick, 1997). These alerts could also be conflicting in the sense that the
information they provide suggests different actions be taken to resolve problems. Figure
1.1, for instance, shows an example conflict between alerting information: system A
commands the operator to climb while system B commands a descent. The difference
could be due to the use of different sensors or different alerting logic by alerting systems.
Alerting Systems Alerting Output
Sensors A
Climb!
Process State Zesrs 
-
Figure 1.1 Schematic of an Alerting Conflict
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In the late 1990s, Pritchett and Hansman explored the concepts of consonance and
dissonance between an alerting system's decisions and a human operator's internal model
of a threat situation (Pritchett & Hansman, 1997). Their work and observed incidents in
the field have shown that a mismatch or dissonance between the human and automation
could lead to undesirable behavior from the human including increased delay in taking
action, failure to take action at all, or even implementing an action contrary to the
automation's command. These human operator responses may lead the process to an
accident, or at least an inefficient operation. In the long run, human operators may
distrust the alerting system. One focus of the development of alerting systems should
therefore be to ensure that the information that is conveyed, the timing of alerts, and the
commands or guidance provided are as much in consonance with the human as possible.
But, certainly there may be cases in which dissonance is unavoidable: for example when
the human is completely unaware of a threat and does not feel there is a problem when in
fact there is. In such cases, it is important to provide corroborating information with the
alert so that the human rapidly understands the rationale behind the alerting decision and
so comes into consonance with the automation as quickly as possible.
Dissonance is likely to be even more problematic when there are multiple
automated systems that are not synchronized. The dissonance between a human
command and automation may have a chance to be resolved through communication
between the humans. For example, if a pilot receives dissonant commands between an
air traffic controller and an on-board alerting system, the dissonance may be resolved
through communication between the pilot and the air traffic controller. But if two on-
board alerting systems give dissonant commands to the pilot, it is hard to get additional
information from the alerting systems to resolve the dissonance. The development of
new alerting systems should therefore consider possible dissonance with other alerting
systems under development or that already exist. Otherwise, different systems might
provide simultaneous but conflicting information which suggest different actions be taken
to resolve problems.
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1.2 Example Problems
Alerting systems on jet transport aircraft, for example, have become more
prevalent and complex over the last several decades. In the era of "steamgauge" aircraft
that relied on electromechanical instruments (before the 1980s), nearly all alerting
functions on aircraft were used to monitor autoflight controls and internal components
such as engines, hydraulics, or electrical systems. One comprehensive study found over
500 different alert displays and functions on the Boeing 747 flight deck (Veitengruber, et
al., 1977). Another study also showed a history of exponential growth in the number of
alerting functions on board aircraft, as shown in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1 Number of Warnings on Aircraft (Hawkins, 1987)
Airframer A/c type No. of Airframer A/c type No. of
Warigs Warnigs
DC-8 B707
McDonnall (1959) 172 Boeing (1958) 188
Douglas DC-10 B747
(1971) 418 (1970) 455
This trend was mitigated through the introduction of more advanced processing
and electronic display technology in the 1980s. This technology allows for multifunction
"glass cockpit" displays, reducing the number of separate lights and gauges, and enabling
more comprehensive and integrative monitoring of systems, rather than requiring a
separate display for each aircraft subsystem.
1.2.1 Dissonance between TCAS and Air Traffic Controller
Since the 1970s, aircraft alerting systems have been increasingly focused on
external threats such as terrain, other air traffic, and weather. Several of these external-
hazard systems are now being augmented by the addition of newer, more capable alerting
systems. In the area of air traffic collision alerting, the Traffic Alert and Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS), for example, was mandated for U.S. transport aircraft in
1993. TCAS uses range, range rate, altitude, and altitude rate between two aircraft via
transponder messages. Based on this information, TCAS has two alerting functions:
Traffic Advisories (TA), which direct the crew's attention to a potential threat, and
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Resolution Advisories (RA), which provide vertical collision avoidance commands to the
crew.
With the alerting system helping to monitor external threats, cases of dissonance
between human and automation have been observed. The mid-air collision between a
ndRussian passenger jet (TU154) and a DHL cargo jet (B757) that occurred on July 2
2002 in Germany, which killed 71 people, exposed a dissonance problem between the
TCAS and the air traffic controller. According to the German air accident investigation
agency (German BFU Web, 2002), the pilot on the Russian passenger jet received
conflicting information from TCAS and the air traffic controller (Figure 1.2).
B757 TU154
T-60 seconds T-36 T-29 T-36 T-43 T-60 seconds
4- . -d -4 -4- 4
TCAS TCAS T-22 ATC TCAS ATC TCAS
"traffic" "descend" "expedite "climb" "descend" "traffic"
TCAS TCAW descent"
"increase "increase
descent T=O climb"
collision
Figure 1.2 Mid-Air Collision on July 2 "d in Germany
As we can see from Figure 1.2, the Russian passenger jet got a TCAS TA fifty seconds
before the collision, then an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) "descent" command, a TCAS
"climb" command, an ATC "expedite descent" command, and a TCAS "increase climb"
command, ending in a collision.
Several near-misses have also happened because of the dissonant information
provided to the pilot between TCAS and the air traffic controller. For example, on
September 2 3rd, 1999 near Zurich, between aircraft CRX518 and BZH83 1, the air traffic
controller issued CRX518 an instruction to climb, when CRX518 and BZH831 were
approximately 10 nm apart on opposite courses (Swiss Aircraft Accident Investigation
Bureau, 2001). At the same time, TCAS commanded CRX518 to descend and BZH831
to climb. Despite the measures taken, both by the air traffic controller and the pilot, a
dangerous encounter occurred (3 rum horizontal and 700 feet vertical separation).
Another near-miss happened On February 2 6 th, 1999 near Lambourne, UK between a
Boeing 737 (B737) and a Gulfstream IV (GIV) (UK AAIB Web, 1999). The B737 was
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turning outbound when the pilot reported that he had TCAS traffic descending. The
controller responded by giving an avoiding action descent, but at that time the pilot of the
B737 was executing a TCAS climb maneuver. If there were no left turn avoiding
maneuver taken by the GIV, the B737 would have passed just behind the GIV. In fact
with the maneuvers carried out by each aircraft, the GIV passed by the B737 at a range of
1.3 nm with a 400 feet vertical separation.
1.2.2 Dissonance during Parallel Approach
Recently, additional collision alerting systems have been under development to
enhance safety and capability for closely-spaced approaches to parallel runways (Waller
& Scanlon, 1996; Kuchar & Carpenter, 1997). Specialized systems are required for
parallel approach capability since TCAS was not developed with this type of operation in
mind and would require major modifications to work in that environment. Thus, there
could soon be two separate traffic collision-warning systems (TCAS plus an alerting
system for parallel approaches). Figure 1.3 shows a possible dissonant situation between
TCAS and the possible alerting system for closely-spaced runway approaches, such as
the Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing parallel approach (AILS) (Waller &
Scanlon, 1996).
C
A AILS alert means TCAs command
turn climb, descend,
turn climb..., descend ..
B
Figure 1.3 Dissonance between AILS and TCAS
Consider the scenario shown in Figure 1.3. Two aircraft, A and B, are executing
parallel approaches when the AILS alerts aircraft A and commands a turning-climb,
because aircraft B is judged as blundering based on the alerting thresholds of AILS.
While aircraft A is taking the evading maneuver (turn-climb), TCAS on aircraft A
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commands a descent because of aircraft C (elsewhere in the traffic pattern). The
confused pilot may not be able to avoid aircraft B or aircraft C.
One means of trying to ensure compatibility of a parallel approach alerting system
with TCAS is to modify air traffic control procedures to reduce the likelihood of a
simultaneous TCAS alert and parallel traffic alert. That is, giving restrictions to other
departure and arrival aircraft when two aircraft are parallel approaching, so that if a
blunder happens, the evading trajectory of the other approaching aircraft will not trigger
TCAS alerts. However, without knowing when and where the dissonance could happen,
it is difficult to implement the proper operational procedure changes. Also changing
operational procedures may largely reduce the efficiency of the airspace around the
airport.
1.2.3 Dissonance between GPWS and EGPWS
The Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) is another alerting system for
the external threats. GPWS was mandated on U.S. transport aircraft in the mid-1970s.
GPWS uses measurements of the height of the aircraft above terrain to predict whether
there is a threat of an accident, and is susceptible to occasional false alarms or late alerts.
In 1999, the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) was introduced to
provide earlier and more accurate warnings of terrain threats. EGPWS uses an on-board
terrain database and includes a graphical display of the terrain field around the aircraft.
EGPWS improved several GPWS alert modes, which resulted in about four times fewer
false alarms, and improved GPWS operation under temperature variation through
replacing barometric altitude with geometric altitude in GPWS envelope modulation
tables. Due to cost and certification issues, GPWS has been retained on aircraft and
EGPWS has been added as a separate, independent system that does not change the
operation of GPWS. The result is that there are now two separate systems, each
monitoring terrain threats and each with different alert threshold criteria and displays. It
is then possible to have dissonant information provided to a pilot from EGPWS and
GPWS for the same terrain situation. For example, EGPWS could command a pilot to
climb but GPWS does not rate the terrain as a threat.
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This dissonance may be prevented through training. The human operators can be
trained to understand that EGPWS and GPWS use different decision-making logic, and
that alerts from the two systems may not occur in concert. But pilots may still get
confused if EGPWS does not rate the terrain as a threat while GPWS does, since EGPWS
is designed to provide an earlier warning of terrain proximity than GPWS. For example,
during an approach procedures, GPWS could give a glide slope alert without EGPWS
alert, when the runway with an Instrument Landing System (ILS) with a good glide slope
is in operation.
1.2.4 Dissonance between TCAS and GPWS
The following actual incident reported to the NASA Aviation Safety and
Reporting System (ASRS) describes the problem of dissonance between two alerting
systems for different threats (Ververs, et al., 1999).
Upon departure from LaGuardia on runway 13, Whitestone climb, passing
approximately 1000 ft agl, a TCASII traffic advisory (TA) 'traffic, traffic'
sounded. At the time we were in instrument meteorological conditions.
Immediately after that a resolution advisory (RA), 'reduce vertical speed,' came on
with the TCASII target superimposed on our aircraft symbol. We began reducing
our climb when an RA 'Descend, Descend' sounded with a vertical speed
command of greater than 2000 fpm annunciated. The target was still directly on
top of us with its relative altitude displayed. We immediately commenced our
descent and exited the clouds at 900 ft agl at which time a GPWS warning came
on saying 'too low, terrain.' By this time speed had built up to 280 knots. I then
decided it was better to take a chance on hitting another airplane versus the sure
thing of colliding with the ground, and directed the first officer to resume the
climb and departure while I turned the transponder to TA only. At this time ATC
gave us a new heading and altitude and I reported the TCASII RA maneuver. All
this time either a TA, RA or GPWS warning had been going on and for a while
'descend, descend' and 'too low, terrain' were being broadcast simultaneously. The
cockpit indeed was a cacophony of bells, whistles and flashing lights.
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(abbreviations were spelled out and nonessential text was added for readability;
ASRS ACCESSION NUMBER: 403254)
As described in the above incident, the crew of this flight received valid but
opposing alerts from the TCAS and GPWS systems. In this time-critical, stressful
situation, the pilots had to decide which alert would take precedence and the appropriate
action to take. Each system was designed with its own goals and objectives. Since the
systems are separate and independent they do not have a common framework to share
intent.
To date, dissonance between TCAS and GPWS has been managed through
prioritization. Terrain is given a higher priority than other air traffic, with the rationale
that all else being equal, it is less likely that an aircraft would collide with another aircraft
than it would hit terrain. Consequently, if TCAS and GPWS are both triggered, the
TCAS alert is inhibited or only displayed passively (i.e., without separate attention-
getting signals). Prioritization can run into trouble, however, if two alerts are both valid
but the operator is only receiving or responding to one. As in the above example,
chances to hit the other aircraft still exist when a pilot takes a maneuver according to
GPWS.
1.2.5 Dissonance between TCAS and ACM
Systems similar to TCAS but using enhanced sensor information and different,
more strategic alerting criteria are currently under development (Kelly, 1999). The
Airborne Conflict Management (ACM) is an example. ACM uses an Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data link to enable longer look-ahead than is
possible with TCAS. These systems could also result in multiple alerting systems
monitoring traffic threats. The different surveillance methods used by TCAS and ACM
may result in dissonance. Alerts from ACM should be harmonized with alerts from
TCAS and vice-versa. The dissonance between TCAS and ACM is analyzed in more
detail in chapter 8 as an example application of this thesis.
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1.2.6 Dissonance Appears in Areas Other than Aerospace
Dissonance problems also appear in other areas where automated alerting systems
are becoming increasingly pervasive, for example, automobiles, chemical and power
control stations, and medical monitoring systems.
Multiple automobile alerting systems are being proposed and developed, with
functions including obstacle avoidance, roadway departure and lane-change warnings,
and intersection collision warning systems (Najm, et al., 2001). Different design logic of
these systems may result in conflicting information for the driver.
In medical applications, increasingly sophisticated medical monitoring systems
have been implemented which apply a rules engine to the information base in medical
information systems (AMIA Panel Presentation, 2000). Many of these systems have
been self-developed at individual institutions and different systems have been developed
for different purposes based on different knowledge bases, which may result in dissonant
alerts provided to caregivers.
1.3 Objective
To date, the management of potential dissonance between systems has occurred
without a structured understanding of the specific issues involved. A potential
dissonance situation is usually detected by chance during the individual system
performance simulation or field test, and managed through prioritization or adding
another filtering system to integrate alerts or procedure. This is not a complete and
effective approach. Not all potential dissonance situations can be predicted through
simulation or field tests; and without a structured understanding of the specific issues
involved in dissonance, it cannot be mitigated effectively. To identify and eliminate all
possible sources of confusion resulting from conflicting sensors, database, and
algorithms, a system-specific analysis of the potential interactions among alerting
systems should be undertaken, starting with early conceptual development and continuing
through installation.
The identification of the potential for dissonance and the development of
mitigation methods would be greatly facilitated through the application of a coherent,
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formal model that articulates the design issues. Such a model would have three benefits.
First, it would aid in understanding the different types of dissonance that may occur.
Second, the model would help in identifying when or where the different types of
dissonance could occur in a given operation. Third, the model may be used to design and
evaluate mitigation contingencies to prevent or preclude dissonance from occurring.
1.4 Overview of thesis
This thesis focuses on the interaction issues between multiple alerting systems,
although a number of issues remain to be resolved regarding general alerting system
design and evaluation (e.g., tradeoffs between nuisance alarms and safety). This thesis
will not include issues that apply to single alerting systems.
This thesis presents a methodology for modeling and analyzing conflicts between
multiple alerting systems. Although the thesis concentrates on applications of dissonance
between alerting systems in aerospace, the methodology can easily be applied to other
fields as well (ground transportation, medical, etc.). Because of its generalized
development, the methodology can also be applied to interaction analysis between non-
alerting decision aid functions (e.g., the Center TRACON Automation System (CTAS),
User Request Evaluation Tool (URET) for controllers, etc.).
Chapter 2 presents a generic framework that facilitates articulating the specific
information elements that are sensed, processed, and displayed by each alerting system,
and the interactions between alerting systems. Based on this framework, different types
of dissonance are presented. Major causes of dissonance are identified: logic differences
and sensor error.
Two major causes of dissonance are analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, a
mathematical method is developed to help in identifying when or where the different
types of dissonance could occur in a given operation when there are logic differences
between two alerting systems. Chapter 4 develops a probabilistic method to analyze the
contribution of sensor error to dissonance and compare it with the contribution of logic
differences.
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In Chapter 5, a hybrid model is developed to fully describe the dynamic behavior
of the process incorporating multiple alerting systems, in which the continuous and
discrete dynamics coexist and interact with each other. Dangerous dissonance space is
identified using backward reachability analysis of the hybrid process. Then Chapter 6
suggests several methods to avoid or mitigate dissonance, especially the dangerous
consequence of dissonance identified in Chapter 5.
The methodology is applied in two examples in Chapters 7 and 8. One is the
conceptual In-Trail spacing example in Chapter 7, which demonstrates the modeling,
analyzing, and mitigating methodologies for dissonance developed from Chapters 2 to 6.
Then the methodology is applied to an actual air traffic separation problem in Chapter 8
to identify the conditions for dissonance and suggest ways to mitigate the dissonance.
Finally, Chapter 9 provides a summary and outlines the major contributions of the
thesis.
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2. Model of Dissonance
Between Multiple Alerting Systems
A significant body of research has focused on the design and use of automation,
with the goal of determining how automation should be implemented to work
harmoniously with the human operator (Endsley, 1995; Sheridan, 1992; Wickens, 1992;
Sarter & Woods, 1995). Endsley, for example, presents arguments that the human's
preconceptions and mental models have a direct effect on how automation improves or
degrades Situation Awareness (SA) (Endsley, 1995). Automation, then, must be
carefully designed and implemented to support the human. If not properly applied,
automation can degrade SA by reducing the human's involvement in monitoring and
control functions.
We move into the issues specifically related to dissonance between two or more
alerting systems. The focus here, then, is on the automation, yet it is critical to remember
that ultimately it is the human's understanding and interpretation of the automation's
displays that affect whether dissonance has an impact.
2.1 General Alerting Systems Background
All alerting systems generally perform four functions, shown in Figure 2.1:
monitoring, situation assessment, attention-getting, and problem resolution. First, on the
left of Figure 2.1, information about the process under control and relevant hazard states
must be monitored through a set of sensors. Each alerting system may use a different set
of sensors, and thus may form a different estimate of what is truly occurring in the
process and environment. Based on this observable information, the alerting system
assesses and categorizes the situation into one of several threat levels according to the
alerting thresholds shown in Figure 2.1. If the threat level is sufficiently high, the human
operator is alerted to the problem. This attention-getting function can range from a
simple aural or visual cue (e.g., a tone or illuminated light), to displays that indicate the
cause for the alert (e.g., a textual or verbal readout such as "Generator Failure"), to
displays that also indicate how to correct the problem. The attention-getting signal also
provides an indication of the urgency of the problem. This urgency may be conveyed
33
implicitly through the general type of hazard that is being encountered, or it may be more
explicitly conveyed by the structure of the alarm signal. For example, a chime sound is
often used for low-urgency alerts, whereas a buzzer or wailing alarm may be used in
more threatening situations (Boucek, et al., 1981; Berson, et al., 1981).
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Figure 2.1 Generalized Alerting System Functions
If the alerting system assessed the situation as a threat, resolution commands or
guidance may be given based on the resolution logic in Figure 2. 1. Problem resolution
may also be performed either explicitly or implicitly by the alerting system. In explicit
systems, additional command or guidance information is presented to the operator. This
may be a verbal message (e.g., "Climb!") and/or may include a visual display indicating
the type of action to be taken and the aggressiveness with which that action should be
taken. In more advanced systems, continuous guidance may be provided to aid in the
resolution action. In implicit systems, the human operator may have a trained response to
a particular alert stage, or may just decide at that time what action is most appropriate.
Also shown in Figure 2.1 is the nominal information path by which the human operator
obtains information about the controlled process and the environment. This information
builds the human's internal model of the situation that may conflict with the conditions
implied by alerting systems.
2.2 Generalized State-Space Representation of Multiple Alerting Systems
A generic state-space representation of the information flow of two alerting
systems in a dynamic environment is shown in Figure 2.2. Additional alerting systems
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could be incorporated into this representation without loss of generality. To help
illustrate the application of the representation to a specific alerting problem, TCAS is
used as a case study.
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Human
information sources
Control
U
Figure 2.2 Generalized State-Space Representation of Multiple Alerting Systems
From a mathematical standpoint, we will denote x as the state vector representing
the complete set of physical parameters that describe the dynamics of a hazard situation.
In the case of TCAS, for example, x represents the three-dimensional position and
velocity vectors of each aircraft involved.
On the left of Figure 2.2, the process' dynamics are determined from a
generalized function, F, of the current state x, operator's inputs u, and modeling or
process dynamics uncertainties, :
i = F(x,u,) (2.1)
In general, the complete state vector x is not available to the alerting system logic,
but is observed through a set of sensors. The resulting information that is observable to
the alerting system is included in the vector y. The alerting systems use possibly
different sets of observable states defined by different functions Gi operating on x. As
shown in Figure 2.2, for the fi alerting system,
yi = Gi(x) (2.2)
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For TCAS, y is a vector including the range, range rate, relative altitude, and
relative altitude rate between two aircraft. Uncertainties in the estimates are modeled
through a noise input vector n. We will denote A as the measurement of vector y
corrupted by noise n. TCAS uses an alpha-beta tracker as an estimator to produce a
filtered estimate of range and range rate (RTCA, 1983). A more complex nonlinear
tracker is used to estimate altitude, and altitude rate. The alpha-beta tracker is a recursive
estimator similar to a Kalman Filter but with constant filter gains of a and ,8.
Alert Stages
Using the information in 5, each alerting system applies a set of threshold
functions or other logic, T in Figure 2.2, to map the situation into an alert stage. The alert
stage is represented by the vector a, and specifies the level of threat according to that
alerting system:
ai = Ti() (2.3)
The logic used by the alerting system to determine the appropriate alert stage and
to provide guidance may vary from simple thresholds based on exceeding some fixed
value to more complex algorithms involving a number of states. Many alerting systems
work with two stages: non-hazardous and hazardous. More complex systems use a series
of stages, each corresponding to a higher level of danger and urgency.
Alerting systems may categorize both the status of each individual hazard under
observation, and also specify an overall threat level. TCAS does this, for example, by
using different graphical icons depicting the threat posed by each nearby aircraft on a
traffic display. Additional aural and visual displays are then used to indicate the overall
threat level and whether any action is required. Thus, there may be two different types of
alert stage, one for each individual hazard and one for the overall system. The hazard
alert stage is defined as a discrete categorization of the level of threat posed by a given
hazard under observation by a system. The system alert stage is the resultant overall level
of threat posed by all the hazards under observation by that system. In TCAS, the system
alert stage is equal to the maximum of all individual hazard alert stages. That is, the
system as a whole takes the worst-case threat and uses its threat level. It could be
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desirable in other applications; however, to use a different method of translating hazard
alert stages into system alert stages.
With TCAS, there are four hazard alert stages:
Stage 0 = No threat. The other aircraft is denoted by a hollow white diamond on
the display.
Stage 1 = Proximate traffic. The other aircraft is shown as a filled white diamond
on the display.
Stage 2 = Caution. The other aircraft is shown as a solid yellow circle.
Stage 3 = Warning. The other aircraft is shown as a solid red square.
There are three corresponding system alert stages for TCAS:
Stage 0 = No threat. No additional information is provided.
Stage 1 = Traffic Advisory (TA). A Master Caution light is illuminated in amber
and an aural "Traffic, Traffic" alert is issued in the cockpit. Stage 1 is active if there is a
caution hazard stage active but no active warning hazard stages.
Stage 2 = Resolution Advisory (RA). A Master Warning light is illuminated in
red, an aural resolution command is issued (such as "Climb! Climb!") and the required
climb angle or climb rate is shown on a cockpit display. Stage 2 is active if any hazard is
in the warning stage.
Resolution Commands
Based on the alert stage and on the other information on the situation, the alerting
system may produce resolution information, c in Figure 2.2, according to the resolution
logic R in Figure 2.2:
c = R(y ,a ) (2.4)
The vector c includes the type of resolution action to be performed (e.g., turn or
climb) and the magnitude of that maneuver. There are a variety of forms of resolution
commands, depending on the complexity of the maneuver to be performed.
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Figure 2.3 shows three different possible styles for the same general command in
which a turning-climb maneuver is desired. Figure 2.3a represents a case in which a
specific target state is conveyed along with a single, specific trajectory to follow to
achieve that target state. In Figure 2.3b, a target state is specified, but the means to
achieve that state is not. Finally, Figure 2.3c shows a verbal command; the target state is
not given explicitly. Which command should be used in a given situation depends on the
degree to which the automation can correctly model and predict the appropriate response.
In poorly structured problems, with many uncertainties, the command without target or
guidance may be the most reasonable as it allows the human to bring to bear his or her
intuition and other information to solve the problem. In well-structured problems,
however, a command with target and/or guidance may facilitate the human in
implementing the most effective response.
Target State Target State
"Turn-Climb,
Turn-Climb...
Initial State Initial State
(a) Target state with guidance (b) Target state without guidance (c) Guidance without target
Figure 2.3 Different Command Styles
Additionally, a complex command can be interpreted as either a simultaneous or
sequential process. Figure 2.4 shows two different interpretations with "turn climb" as
the example. Figure 2.4a describes a simultaneous turning-climb path, while Figure 2.4b
shows a sequential case: first turn, then climb.
Commanded Commanded
Trajectory Trajectory *:climb
turn
Initial 2. Initial
Trajectory Trajectory
(a) Turn-climb simultaneously (b) Turn and climb sequentially
Figure 2.4 Command Sequencing
Given all the possible combinations of alert stages and command types, it is clear
that there is a rich design space for alerting systems. As a consequence, it is possible
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(and even probable) that two different alerting systems will apply different alert stage or
command definitions to a similar problem. This may lead to indicated dissonance as is
discussed in a later section.
Complete Set of Transmitted Information
Referring back to Figure 2.2, z is the vector of complete information displayed to
the human operator by the alerting system. In general, z includes signals designed to
attract the operator's attention, the alert stage, and information to resolve the situation.
The function D describes the display mapping from the state estimates available to the
alerting system (y ) to the information provided to the human operator (z) based on the
alert stage (a) and resolution information (c):
z= D,(f,,a,,c,) (2.4)
For TCAS, the information in z includes a traffic display in the cockpit, aural
messages, lights, and any resolution command and guidance information.
In addition to the alerting systems, there may be other, nominal information
sources that provide information to the operator. This information is included in the
vector Ynom, which is then modified by the nominal displays Dnom as shown on the bottom
in Figure 2.2. Cockpit instruments, air traffic control communications, views through the
windscreen, vestibular inputs, and aeronautical charts are examples of nominal
information sources for a pilot. The operator is also affected by other factors such as the
pilot's internal model of the situation, knowledge of the alerting system's role, prior
training, fatigue, and previous experience. Past exposure to false alarms, for instance, has
been observed to be a factor in delaying responses to alerts (DeCelles, 1992). This
modifying information is included in the vector e in Figure 2.2. The function H on the
right in Figure 2.2 then maps the observable states (via all the alerting systems and
nominal information sources) to the control inputs u. That is,
u= H(zno,,e,zi,Z2 ) (2.5)
Ultimately, it is how the inputs to the pilot (as contained in znom, Zi, Z2, and e) are
used to develop a control strategy that determines whether there is a perceived dissonance
between the information elements being used. In this context, Pritchett and Hansman's
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work examined dissonance between zi for a single alerting system and the nominal
information provided to the human in znom. Here, we focus on dissonance across the
information provided by two different alerting systems, as contained in zi and Z2.
2.3 Multiple Alerting Systems Dissonance
Having introduced a general state-space representation for multiple alerting
systems, it is now possible to more formally state the types of dissonance that may occur.
Dissonance occurs when the alerting systems' states have information content and
representations that explicitly suggest different timing of alerts and actions to resolve the
hazard (Pritchett & Hansman, 1997). There are two main types of dissonance, indicated
and perceived dissonance which we defined and discussed in the next two sections.
2.3.1 Indicated Dissonance
At a high level, all alerting systems can be thought of as mapping a set of
estimated states of a controlled process into discrete alert stages and discrete or
continuous hazard resolution commands. Indicated dissonance is a mismatch of
information (different alert stages or different resolution commands) between alerting
systems.
Table 2.1 provides a listing of different forms of indicated dissonance. Each row
in Table 2.1 corresponds to a type of indicated dissonance with certain properties. The
right side of the table provides an example situation with two alerting systems in which
that category of indicated dissonance is present. For example, having one system
command "climb" while a second system commanded "descend" would be a resolution
polarity conflict. Each of these forms of indicated dissonance is discussed in more detail
below.
Table 2.1 Alerting System Indicated Dissonance Types
Example Dissonant Situation
Indicated Dissonance Type System 1 System 2
system alert stage no threat warningAlert Stage hazard alert stage aircraft A is a threat aircraft B is a threat
dimension turn climb
Resolution polarity climb descend
magnitude turn 50 turn 300
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As we stated in Figure 2.2, vector z includes the signals designed to attract the
operator's attention, the alert stage, and the information to resolve the situation. So
mathematically, when zi # Z2 at a given time for two alerting systems, indicated
dissonance may exist. Breaking z into its components, first consider indicated alert stage
dissonance. Differences in system alert stage can cause indicated dissonance (first row of
Table 2.1). For example, EGPWS and GPWS are both alerting systems for terrain.
EGPWS is designed to provide an earlier warning of terrain proximity than GPWS. So,
usually the alert stage from EGPWS is at a higher level than that from GPWS. There is
indicated dissonance since two systems are in different alert stages.
Another type of indicated dissonance can occur when there is a difference in the
hazard alert stage for a given threat, even if the system alert stages are consistent (second
row of Table 2.1). This could happen, for example, in a case with two traffic alerting
systems monitoring two different aircraft A and B. If system 1 rates aircraft A as a low
threat (circle) and aircraft B as a high threat (square) while system 2 does the opposite
(Figure 2.5), then both systems may agree with the same high-threat system alert stage,
but the underlying hazard alert stages for each threat are different. The operator then may
distrust one or both systems since they are disagreeing on the cause for the system alert
stage.
System 1 System 2
Figure 2.5 Indicated Dissonance Because of Different Hazard Alert Stages
Indicated dissonance can also occur due to the resolution information contained in
z. Recalling Figures 2.3 and 2.4, the resolution information can be thought of as
trajectories of varying levels of abstraction that are intended to direct the human operator
to a safe target state. If two trajectories are in different dimensions, then there is
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indicated dissonance (e.g., a case where system 1 commands a change in altitude but
system 2 commands a change in heading). If two commands are in the same dimension,
then dissonance may still be indicated due to different polarities or magnitudes of the
commands. If two systems are both commanding a change in altitude, but system 1
commands a climb and system 2 commands a descent, there is clearly indicated
dissonance. Or, if system 1 commands a much stronger climb than system 2, there is
indicated dissonance.
2.3.2 Perceived Dissonance
The mismatch of information between alerting systems may not be aware to be
dissonant by the human operator. It really depends on the human to decide how
difference between the information conveyed to the human ultimately translates into
dissonance. We define perceived dissonance as a situation in which information from
two or more alerting systems have content or representations that suggest different timing
of alerts and actions to resolve a hazard.
The indicated dissonance may not perceived as dissonance if the human operator
knows why dissonance is indicated. In the case of GPWS and EGPWS, if EGPWS alert
without GPWS alert, that may not perceived as dissonance if the pilot understand the
rationale behind the alerting decision. And if GPWS is at a higher alert stage than
EGPWS, there may perceived as dissonance even if the pilot has been trained to
understand the rationale behind the alerting decision, because the pilot may not
understand why EGPWS does not rate the terrain as a threat while GPWS does.
Differences in system alert stage can be present without causing perceived
dissonance if the two alerting systems have different roles. For example, EGPWS is
designed to provide an warning of terrain and TCAS is designed for other traffic. There
is no perceived dissonance if TCAS gives an alert while GPWS is silent, although there is
indicated dissonance since two systems are in different alert stages. It could still have
perceived dissonance if both TCAS and GPWS alert but TCAS commands to descend
and GPWS commands to climb.
Given the wide variety of commands that can be issued as illustrated in Figures
2.3 and 2.4, there may be subtleties in the commands that affect whether certain
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differences are perceived to be dissonant or not. The general concept, however, is that
the resolution trajectories implied by the command (whether implicit or explicit) should
not be disjoint; otherwise, dissonance is likely to be perceived. That is, perceived
command dissonance could occur if the intersection between the allowed action spaces of
two alerting systems is empty. For example, in Figure 2.6 (a), system 1 commands a
climb, which assumes that the pilot would follow a 0.25g pull-up to the commanded pitch
attitude after a five second reaction time, so the allowed action space is the gray area in y-
z space; system 2 commands a right turn, which implies that the pilot would take 50 bank
angle to the commanded heading after a five second reaction time, thus the allowed
action space of this command is the gray area in x-y space. The empty intersection of the
two allowed action space means dissonance. Different human operators may have
different interpretations of system commands, though. For example, the human operator
may interpret the allowed action space of the climb or turn command as some subsets of
x-y-z three-dimensional space (Figure 2.6 (b)). Then the intersection between the
allowed action spaces of two alerting systems is not empty. Thus, the human operator
may not think there is dissonance if one system commands a climb but the other
commands a turn.
zy
w cAllowed actin space
of system 2(trn command)
xAllowed actioDn space Intersection of two system
ofsystem I (climb command) allowed action space
(a) (b)
Figure 2.6 Perceived Command Dissonance
In some cases, the indicated consonance may still be perceived as dissonance,
with the human operator being affected by many other factors, for example, the dynamics
of the process, the nominal information, the human mental model, etc. Consider two
collision-alerting systems, where one system initially indicates no threat while the second
system indicates a high degree of danger and a warning is issued (Figure 2.7). However,
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if the first system upgrades the alert stage to a caution while the second system
downgrades the alert stage, also to a caution, perceived dissonance exists because of the
effect of process dynamics. Even though the two systems now agree about the proper
alert stage, there is no indicated dissonance, the human may be uncertain as to whether
the situation is improving or getting worse due to the perceived dissonance.
System 1 System 2
t=O Nothre Nothrea
Figure 2.7 Example Perceived Dissonance Due to Process Dynamics (1)
Another example of perceived dissonance due to process dynamics is shown in
Figure 2.8, where the process state is jumping between two alerting systems' alert spaces.
As shown in Figure 2.8, the process state enters alert space of system 1, system 1 gives
some commands to avoid hazard 1; just after the alert goes off, the process enters the
alert space of system 2, which triggers system 2 alert and command to take opposite
maneuver given by system 1; and the switch goes on and on. If the switches happen
rapidly, dissonance may be perceived, and the operator may distrust both systems and try
to get out of the oscillate situation with some other maneuvers.
state space
process trajectory
in stat pace
System 1 System 2
Figure 2.8 Example Perceived Dissonance Due to Process Dynamics (2)
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One critical consideration of perceived dissonance due to process dynamics is that
its impact may depend on how rapidly the changes in alert information occur. Recall the
example above where one system initially indicated no threat and a second system
indicated a high degree of danger. If both systems change to a moderate-caution level
simultaneously, it is likely there would be a stronger perceived dissonance than if one
system changed to caution followed by a significant delay before the second system also
indicated caution.
2.3.3 Major Causes of Indicated Dissonance
To be able to deal with dissonance schematically, we need to identify when and
where dissonance could happen, that is, the major causes and conditions for dissonance.
Certainly, the perceived dissonance is the important one. However, most perceived
dissonance are caused by indicated dissonance or somehow related to indicated
dissonance. Thus, it's important to identify the causes of indicated dissonance. Based on
the general state-space representation of multiple alerting systems, two major causes of
indicated dissonance can be identified: logic differences and sensor error.
Alerting systems map a set of measured or estimated states of a controlled process
into discrete alert stages and discrete or continuous hazard resolution commands. So, if
there is indicated dissonance between alert stages or resolution commands (output a or
ci) between two alerting systems, it could be because of (1) a difference in alerting
thresholds or resolution logic (mapping T or Ri) or (2) a difference in measured states
(input y,) between the two alerting systems (Figure 2.9).
Resolution Resolution commands or
Logic guidance
ThresholdsR
Yi y,, a
Attention-getting and
urgency
Figure 2.9 Mapping of Alerting System
Sensor systems, corrupted by noise n, map the observable states y into the
measured states y (Figure 2.10). Thus, the difference between the measured states could
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be because of a difference in sensor error or a difference in the sensor coverage, that is,
the types of observable states between the two alerting systems.
I nl
II
X G filter
I Yi Yi
Sensor systems
Figure 2.10 Mapping of Sensor
In next two chapters, mathematical methods are developed to identify the
conditions for dissonance originating from two major factors: (1) the alerting thresholds
or logic differences, and (2) sensor error. Since the different types of observable states
will result in different alerting thresholds or logic, these two factors cover all possible
causes of indicated dissonance.
It is also important to identify how the indicated dissonance would be perceived
as dissonance by the human operator. In this thesis, we are not focusing on the human
factor issues or the human operator's mental model to analyze other factors which will
cause perceived dissonance. However, the methodology developed in the following
chapters can be applied to mathematically represent the conditions for perceived
dissonance, as long as some subsets of the state-space are examined to have perceived
dissonance. Then the probabilistic method developed in Chapter 4 can be applied to
analyze the contribution of sensor error to the perceived dissonance, the hybrid model
developed in Chapter 5 can be applied to identify the dangerous consequence of
perceived dissonance, and the methods outlined in Chapter 6 can be applied to avoid or
mitigate perceived dissonance.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, a state-space representation of multiple alerting systems was
generalized, which facilitates articulating the specific information elements that are
sensed, processed, and displayed by each alerting system, and the interactions between
alerting systems. The representation was used to analyze different types of dissonance
and identify the major causes of indicated dissonance.
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Different types of indicated dissonance were identified, including how the
indicated dissonance is connected to differences in alert stage or resolution command
information. Major causes of indicated dissonance were identified to help in identifying
conditions for dissonance in the following chapters.
Since the methodologies developed in the following chapters can be applied to
both indicated and perceived dissonance, "dissonance" is used to indicate both indicated
and perceived dissonance in the rest of the thesis.
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3. Dissonance Originating from Logic Differences
The preceding chapter developed a generalized state-space representation of
multiple alerting systems to classify different types of dissonance. An additional step is
to formulate a means of identifying how these dissonances originate, that is, the
conditions for dissonance. By exposing those situations that lead to dissonance, the
system design can be modified, operations can be changed, or the operators can be
trained to work around the dissonance.
As identified in Chapter 2, one of the major causes of dissonance is a logic
difference between two systems. When two systems are designed to protect against
different hazards or when different time scales are used by two systems for the same
hazard, threshold functions Ti and resolution logic Ri as we defined in Chapter 2 are
usually different in order to satisfy different objectives. Also, different systems may have
different observable information. Thus, two systems may be in different alert stages or
provide different resolution advisories for the same process state. In this chapter, we
develop ways to identify the conditions in which the alert stages or resolution advisories
produce dissonance.
3.1 Formal Description of Threshold Functions
To expose those conditions where dissonance may occur, we begin by examining
the state space of the alerting system and observing when alerts are issued. The threshold
functions for each alerting system, T, and T2, map a given state of the process into a
corresponding alert stage. These threshold functions are typically defined by a set of
predicates (or inequality statements) based on certain parameter values. Each predicate
evaluates to either true or false. One example predicate for collision alerting might be:
"if the time to impact is less than p seconds, then use alert stage 1", where p is some
parameter value. In general, there may be a set of such comparisons made between the
states in y and a set of threshold parameters. To begin, we assume the alerting system
uses the exact observable states, that is, no sensor error is considered.
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Let the itih alerting system have a number of such predicates where thej* predicate
is denotedfy. Each predicate represents a boundary that divides the state space into a
subset. Inside the subset, the predicate is true; outside, the predicate is false.
Combinations of these subsets then form the alert stage space within the universe of the
state space, U. Each resulting subset is denoted Aik for the k alert stage of system i
(Figure 3.1). It is then possible to map out what states in the space of y lead to different
alert stages. For example, in Figure 3.1, alerting system I has two alert stages. A I
represents the set of states in which system 1 is in alert stage 1 and A12 represnets alert
stage 2. As shown, A I is active when predicate fi I orfi2 is true but fi3 is false; and A12 is
active when predicatefi3 is true.
State Space U
A10
Figure 3.1 Example Predicates and Alert Stages
Thus, the threshold functions of an alerting system can be formally described by
their corresponding predicates. For example, the threshold function of system 1 in Figure
3.1 can be formally described as,
fl, : F(y,pl) < 0
12 : F12 (yP 12 ) < 0
fl 3 : FW y, PI) < 0(31
12 = 3(3.1)
All = Ai3 r)(AIl U A12
Ao =U - All - A12
where the jth predicatefij is described as an inequality statement of the observable state y
and a set of parameters pij; and alert stages are the subsets of the whole state space
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described by the combinations of true or false of predicates. For example, when fh3 is
false andfu orfi is true, the given state y is in alert stage 1 of alerting system 1.
For some alerting systems, when system is in high alert stage, there may have
different rules that decide different resolution command suggested to the human operator.
These rules can also be represented as predicates, then the alert stage can be further
separated into subsets. In each of these subsets, the alerting system would be in the same
alert stage but with different commands. For example, when the system described in
Figure 3.1 is in alert stage 2, if predicatesfi4 is true, then the system will command to
climb, otherwise, it will command to descend. Then the subset A12 can be fatherly
separated into two subsets A 121 and A 122 (Figure 3.2). In subset A 12 1, the system will
command to climb, and in subset A122, the system will command to descend.
State Space U
A10
Figure 3.2 Example Subsets of Different Commands
The threshold function of system 1 in Figure 3.2 can be formally described as,
fl, : F11(y,pj) < 0
fA2 : F12 (y,p 12)< 0
fA3 : F13 (yP 13 ) < 0
fA4 : F14 (y,'p 14 )<O (3.2)
A121 = f 3 r f14
A122 =_A3 rf 1 4
A, = f 1 3 r)( 11 U fA2)
A10 =U-A 1 -A 12
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3.2 Identification of Conditions to Dissonance
When the two systems operate simultaneously, the combinations of alert stages
lead to behavior that may result in dissonance. The combinations of the alert stages of
the two systems are given by the intersections of the Aik sets. These intersection sets are
denoted Smn where m is the alert stage from system 1 and n is the alert stage from system
2:
Smn = Almr)A 2n (3.3)
For example, if alerting system 2 can be represented in the same state space as
system 1 (Figure 3.3), and the threshold function of alerting system 2 can be formally
described as,
f 21 : F21 (y, p21) < 0
A21 = f( (3.4)
A,20 = U - A21
State SpaceU
Figure 3.3 Predicates and Alert Stages of System 2
Then there are five combinations of the alert stages of the two alerting systems (Figure
3.4). S11, for example, in Figure 3.4 represents the set of states where both systems are
in alert stage 1.
Sets Smn can be examined to decide if there is perceived dissonance, the
dissonance space is the subset in which dissonance would be perceived. Then, the
conditions for dissonance are the conditions for those sets Sn. In this example, since the
subset A 12 has been further separated into two subsets A 12 1 and A 122, we need to further
examine which part of S21 would be perceived as dissonance. Assume that system 2 will
command to descend when it is in alert stage 1, then the part of S21 (S211) in which system
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1 command to climb and system 2 command to descend is the dissonance space. Then the
condition for this dissonance space is
S211 = A121 n4 21 =fA3 n A 4 f21  (3.5)
State Space U
Soo A10 nA 2 0
Figure 3.4 Example Combinations of Alert Stages
It is worth mentioning that the observable states are usually different for different
alerting systems. Thus, the threshold functions for different alerting systems are usually
described in different state spaces. To be able to identify the conditions for dissonance,
we need to map the threshold functions of the different alerting systems into the same
state space. For the example talked above, if the original threshold functions of alerting
system 2 are described in state space y', that is, the predicatef21 is originally described as
<0 (3.5)F21(y', P') < 0(3)
it needs to be mapped into
F21(yIP21) < 0 (3.6)
which is in the same state space as alerting system 1, through state space transformation.
And if two state spaces are orthogonal, then the union of state spaces are needed to
identify the conditions for dissonance. For example, if the threshold functions of alerting
system 1 are described in state space yi while system 2 in state space Y2, and yi and y2 are
orthogonal, then the formal descriptions of both systems' threshold functions are needed
to be presented in state space y = YI +Y2 -
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3.3 Dissonance Analysis Due to Process Dynamics
Uncertainties
Process
F
Xif'
Nominal
information sources
experience,
training, etc.
e
z
Human
H
2n,
Control u
Figure 3.5 Closed Loop for System Dynamics
The state space map described above can also be used to examine time-varying
behavior leading to perceived dissonance. By injecting the system dynamics from the
functions F (where i = F(x,u,4)) and H (where u = H(znm, , ,z 2 )) (Figure 3.5),
complete state trajectories can be developed in the state space. Then, the progression of
the process state from one alerting region to another can be predicted. This can highlight
dissonance that may perceived when one system upgrades the alert stage while a second
system downgrades it (e.g., transitions from Sio to Sol).
Figure 3.6 shows a example trajectory in the state space shown in Figure 3.4 with
two alerting systems.
Figure 3.6 Example Analysis of Dissonance Due to Process Dynamics
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State Space U
As we can see from Figure 3.6, following the trajectory shown, the process will
first trigger a system 2 alert, then a system 1 alert, and as the process leaves the alert
space of system 2, system 1 is further upgrading its alert stage. The different trends of
alert information from two systems may be perceived as dissonance due to process
dynamics.
When examining perceived dissonance due to process dynamics, it is important to
also consider the timescales over which the alerting systems transition from one alert
stage or resolution command to another. Whether dissonance would be perceived when
two systems' alert information change in opposite directions depends on how rapidly this
change occurs relative to the timescales of the system dynamics and the human's
cognition. It is unlikely that two systems would change alert stages in opposition at
precisely the same moment. Rather, there would probably be some time lag between
these changes. A short lag may result in perceived dissonance, while a longer lag may
not result in any dissonance. Further work in this area of human factors is needed to
determine how rapidly systems must change for dissonance to be perceived.
The trajectory shown in Figure 3.6 assumes that the human operator does not
respond to the alerting systems alerts, thus, there is no discrete change in the continuous
dynamics of the process. In Chapter 5, the interaction between the continuous dynamics
and the discrete state changes will be formally modeled. Then, the dangerous dissonance
space can be identified, and the dangerous consequences of dissonance can be eliminated.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a mathematical analysis method to identify the
conditions for dissonance originating from logic differences, through formally describing
the threshold functions of alerting systems.
Perceived dissonance due to process dynamics can also be analyzed by
introducing the trajectory of the process into the state space representation of the
threshold functions.
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4. Dissonance Originating from Sensor Error
When two alerting systems use different sensors to monitor the process, even if
they have the same alerting threshold function or resolution logic, they may be in
different alert stages due to sensor error. In this chapter, an analysis of how sensor error
affects dissonance is provided. A probabilistic analysis methodology has been developed
to compare the contribution of sensor error to dissonance against the contribution of logic
differences. In this thesis, we focused on the sensor error, but not measurement update
rate issues, though one extension to the method is provided for cases where sensors have
different discrete update rates.
4.1 Analysis of Dissonance Originating from Sensor Error
Given a true state that is outside the dissonance space defined by a logic
difference, the measurement of that state given by two systems could still trigger
dissonance with some probability because of measurement error.
State Spacey
distribution of distribution of
measurement error ofsystem I measurement error ofsystem 2
yI=y+nI y 2 =y+n 2
Sio Sol
System System 2
given true state y
Figure 4.1 The Measurement of a True State
For example, in Figure 4.1, suppose the dissonance space is S 1 , where both
alerting systems alert but present dissonant resolution advisories. The given true state y
is in space Sol, which is outside the dissonance space S I. With sensor error, the
measurement obtained by system 1 may still trigger an alert placing yI inside its alert
threshold boundary, and the measurement obtained by system 2 may trigger an alert if Y2
is inside its alert threshold boundary. Thus, a true state outside dissonance space may
still trigger dissonance.
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4.1.1 Probability of Dissonance Given a True State
Given a true state y, because of the measurement noise of each system ni, the
measured state is given by y, = y + n,. Given the probability density function (PDF) of
the measurement noise of each alerting system f. (n,), the PDF f,1 (^, 1 y), describing
the measured state, is given as
fj ,(Y, i Iy)= f (y)fi (y, - yy,= (j, -y) (4.1)
Then the probability of system 1 alert for the given true state in the example described
above can be given as (Figure 4.2)
P = P(SystemlAlert I y) = f (y I y)d^Y1
State space yI
Set B SOtSystem System 2
given true state y
Figure 4.2 Probability of System 1 Alert
And the probability of system 2 alert is (Figure 4.3)
P = P(System2Alert I y) = f, ( 2 1 y)d 2
State space Y2  fy Y)
SO,
System f si Sysm2
given tre state y
Figure 4.3 Probability of System 2 Alert
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(4.2)
(4.3)
Then if the measurements from two systems are independent, then the probability
of dissonance is
P(DIy)= P(S11 y) = P1 1 x P (4.5)
If the measurements from two systems are correlated, we can run a Monte Carlo
Simulation to obtain the ratio of the measured state being in dissonance space, which is
the probability of dissonance for the given true state. Also note that equations (4.2) and
(4.3) could be extended to multidimensional PDFs.
4.1.2 False Dissonance and Missed Dissonance
With the measurement noise, it is possible that the measured state triggers
dissonance although the true state is not in the dissonance space (false dissonance); or the
measured state may not trigger dissonance even though the true state is in dissonance
space (missed dissonance). Given a true state and the PDF f,jY (y, I y) for both systems,
we can obtain the probability of false dissonance and missed dissonance.
For the same example shown in Figure 4.1, given a true state which is outside the
dissonance space S, , false dissonance occurs if each measured state triggers each
system alert. That is, the probability of false dissonance is
P(FalseDissonanceI y) = P(S11 I y) = P11x P (4.6)
which is the same as equation (4.5).
Given a true state y which is inside the dissonance space S, , missed dissonance
occurs when one or both of the two alerting systems misses detecting the hazard. That is,
the probability of missed dissonance is
P(MissedDissonance y) = P(S0 I y) + P(SO1 I y) + P(SO I y)
=Pio x P 1 + P x P20 + PIO x P20
Where P10 is the probability with no system 1 alert. That is (Figure 4.4)
P10 = P(SystemINoAlert l y)= Iffi( y y)d 1 + ff 1 1(y I y)d51  (4.8)
And P20 is the probability with no system 2 alert. That is (Figure 4.5)
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= P(System2NoAlert I y)= f (y2 y)dy 2 + f (y2 Iy)dy2
State space yfl
Sio
A1 B jo
Systemi System2
given true state y
(4.9)
Figure 4.4 Probability of System 1 No Alert
State space Y2 fj 2 Y)
SIO
C Sol
System System 
2
given true state y D
Figure 4.5 Probability of System 2 No Alert
4.1.3 Redistribution of Threshold Functions Considering Sensor Error
From another aspect view of sensor error, we can translate the sensor error into a
redistribution of the threshold functions of each alerting system. Then, a similar method
to that developed in Chapter 3 for logic difference can be applied to identify the
conditions for dissonance originating from sensor error.
Since the threshold function is a function of 5, the threshold functions are
themselves functions of random variables. That is,
a = T(y)= T(y +n) (4.10)
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The distributions of threshold functions for each alerting system can be
determined through algebraic operations on random variables.
For example, in Figure 4.6, the solid line is the original threshold boundary. That
is, if the measured state y is inside the boundary, the system will give an alert. Given the
sensor error distribution, the threshold boundary in terms of y are the dashed lines,
between which the measured state will trigger system alert with some probability. The
alerting space has been enlarged to the outer dashed line because of the false alarms
introduced by sensor error. And those states inside the original threshold function have
some probability of missed detection.
State space y original threshold function
shape of sensor
error distribution
in one dimension 
'probabilistic threshold
finctionboundary
Figure 4.6 Translate Sensor Error to Threshold Boundary Change
Now, using the same example as in Figure 4.1 with S 1 as dissonance space, we
can consider the threshold change after introducing the sensor error and analyze the
redistribution of dissonance space (Figure 4.7).
In Figure 4.7, dissonance space is now probabilistic. For example, point C in
Figure 4.7 is outside the original dissonance space, but it could trigger dissonance with
some probability because of sensor error, which is false dissonance. Similarly, point A
will trigger system dissonance with some probability. The dark space between inner
dashed lines is smaller compared to the original dissonance space because of missed
dissonance. For example, point B in Figure 4.7 is inside the original dissonance space,
but it may not trigger dissonance because of sensor error, which is missed dissonance.
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Figure 4.7 Dissonance Space Change with Sensor Errors
Given a requirement of the probability for dissonance, the new alert stage
boundaries can be determined, and then the same analysis method we used for dissonance
due to logic differences can be used to identify the conditions leading to dissonance with
some probability.
4.2 Example Analysis of the Contribution of Sensor Error
For a real alerting system, sensor error always exists at some level. Given a
restriction that there should be no dissonance with some probability, we can modify the
system design to avoid dissonance by identifying the conditions for dissonance with some
probability. Since dissonance occurs from two different parts, logic difference and sensor
error, we want to identify the contribution of each part. This can be used to help the
designer to decide the best way to mitigate dissonance (such as, using a more accurate
sensor, or modifying the design of the alerting logic). Knowing the probability of
dissonance for each true state in the design space would help the designer to reshape the
threshold functions for each alerting system.
In this section, we will give some example analysis of the probability of
dissonance, identify the contribution of sensor error to dissonance for a set of uncertain
trajectories, and compare it with the contribution of logic difference. At this point, it is
assumed that each alerting system is affected independently by noise.
Let P, denote the probability that system 1 is in alert stage m, P2 n the
probability that system 2 is in alert stage n, and D be the event of dissonance. For a given
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true state y, if the dissonance space is S., and if the measurements from two systems
are independent, then the probability of dissonance for the given true state y is
P(DIy)= Pi, x P2n (4.11)
That is, equation (4.5) is the probability when system 1 is in alert stage m and system 2 is
in alert stage n for the given true state. Probabilities Pi,, and P2,, can be obtained
analytically as we described in section 4.1.1 or through simulation. If the measurements
of two systems are correlated, the probability of dissonance for the given true state can be
obtained by counting the fraction of measured states in dissonance space during the
simulation.
If an entire trajectory is expected to be followed, the designer may want to know
the cumulative probability of dissonance occurring at some point along the trajectory.
This will help the designer or the operator to modify the procedures to mitigate
dissonance.
Consider a given true trajectory T. We define the cumulative probability of
dissonance up to time t along the trajectory as
Pc (D I T(t)) = 1- fl(1 - P(D I y(t))) (4.12)
t=O
where f (1- P(D I y(t))) is the probability of no dissonance up to time t. And as time
t=O
goes to infinity, we have the cumulative probability of dissonance over the entire
trajectory T,
P. (D I T)= limP,(DI T(t)) (4.13)
This value helps the designer or operator to know the trend of the probability of
dissonance along the trajectory.
It is worth mentioning that we assumed that two systems have the same
measurement update rate in equation (4.12). Thus, two systems are measuring the same
true state y(t) at time t. If two systems have different measurement update rates (r, for
system 1 and r2 for system 2), the true state that system 1 measures would be different
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from the true state that system 2 measures at time t (Figure 4.8). In Figure 4.8, y(t) is the
true states as time changes, yi(t) is the state that system 1 measures as time changes, and
y2(t) is the state that system 2 measures as time changes.
state Y(O
- y 1(t)
t
Figure 4.8 Considering Different Measurement Update Rate
Assuming Smn is the dissonance space, then the probability of dissonance at time t
would be given by
P(D t) = Pi (y 1(t)) x P2,, (Y 2 (t)) (4.14)
That is, it is equal to the probability of system 1 being in alert stage m given y I(t)
times the probability of system 2 being in alert stage n given Y2 (t), assuming the
measurement of two systems are independent. If the measurements of two systems are
correlated, the probability of dissonance at time t can be obtained by counting the fraction
of measured states causing dissonance during the simulation. Then the cumulative
probability of dissonance up to time t along the trajectory is given by
Pc (DI T(t))=1- H(1- P(D It)) (4.15)
t=0
In most cases, we don't know exactly which trajectory will be followed. Based
on experience or after running simulations, we may be able to determine the probability
distribution of a set of r different uncertain trajectories P(T). From this, we can get an
overall cumulative probability of dissonance for a set of uncertain trajectories:
P.0(D)= P(DI T,) x P(T) (4.16)
i=1
64
This value helps the designer or operator to know what the chance is of getting a
dissonance situation in the future, given a starting point.
After defining the probability of dissonance, we can analyze the effect of sensor
accuracy on the probability of dissonance.
Consider a set of possible trajectories without any noise. We use P' to denote
probabilities in ideal conditions without any noise. This set of trajectories can be
separated into two subsets. Subset A includes those trajectories in which there are states
in the dissonance space, that is, P'(D Ti) = 1. Subset B includes those trajectories in
which there is no state in dissonance space, that is, P.(D I T) = 0. So, due to logic
difference alone, the overall cumulative probability of dissonance for a set of uncertain
trajectories is
P' (D)= P' (DI T) x P(T) (4.17)
i=1
From this, the contribution of sensor error to dissonance P.(D) can be compared
to the contribution of logic difference to dissonance P'(D).
Considering sensor accuracy, we can define the probability of false dissonance as
the probability of dissonance triggered by those trajectories in subset B, on which there is
no true state in the dissonance space contributed by logic difference. That is,
PFD= XP(T)x P.(DI T) (4.18)
T', eB
And the probability of missed dissonance is defined as the probability of dissonance
missed by those trajectories in subset A, on which there are true states in the dissonance
space contributed by logic difference, that is,
PmD= ET) x P.e !GT)= J P(T) x (1-- P(D| T)) (4.19)
T E=A T riA
where D means no dissonance. So, the total probability of dissonance with sensor error
would be
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00(D)= P'(D)+PFD~MD P(Tx oDP T, ) (4.20)
Usually, sensor error would increase the overall probability of dissonance. However,
when PFD <MD' P(D)< P'(D), and sensor error may actually provide some benefit,
decreasing the overall probability of dissonance. This may not be a good thing though.
Decreased overall cumulative probability of dissonance means a larger probability of
missed dissonance, which also means that one of the alerting systems may have missed
detection of the hazard. The hazard may not be able to be avoided because of this missed
detection.
This analysis method will be demonstrated in Chapter 7 for the In-Trail separation
example to compare the contribution of sensor error to dissonance with the contribution
of logic differences. The ways to mitigate dissonance through modifying alerting system
threshold functions will be described in Chapter 6 and demonstrated in Chapter 7 for the
In-Trail separation example.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter, a method is provided to identify the conditions for dissonance
originating from sensor error, which is similar to the method in Chapter 3 for the
dissonance originating from logic differences, by translating the sensor error into the
threshold function redistribution.
A probabilistic analysis method is developed to compare the contribution of
sensor error to dissonance with the contribution of logic differences. Concepts of False
Dissonance and Missed Dissonance are defined to explain the contribution of sensor error
to dissonance.
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5. Hybrid System Analysis of Consequences of
Dissonance
Human operators may increase delay in taking action, fail to take any action at all,
or implement action contrary to automation command when they are exposed to
dissonance. This unpredictable response to dissonance may cause the process to become
unsafe, even though each alerting system alone has been designed to avoid hazards. This
type of dissonance should be avoided or mitigated.
Modifying the design of logic to eliminate all of dissonance space may decrease
overall system efficiency and capability. Meanwhile, unsafe consequences of dissonance
should be avoided. Thus, the regions of dangerous dissonance space, in which the human
operator's unpredictable response will cause the process to become unsafe, need to be
identified. Then the process can still stay safe by modifying the design of logic to
eliminate regions of dangerous dissonance space, or through modifying the process'
operation to avoid regions of dangerous dissonance space.
A process with logical alerting systems can be considered as a hybrid system,
since the process dynamics are continuously changing and the state of alerting systems
are discretely changing. Thus continuous and discrete dynamics coexist and interact with
each other in the process with multiple alerting systems. In this chapter, a hybrid model
is developed to accurately describe the dynamic behavior of the process incorporating
multiple alerting systems. Using the hybrid model, dangerous dissonance space is
identified through backward reachability analysis. Then, the mitigation method to avoid
dangerous dissonance space through modifying control strategy is described in Chapter 6.
5.1 Dangerous Dissonance Space
To be able to focus on the unsafe consequences because of dissonance only, we
assume here that each alerting system is individually well designed. That is, if the human
operator would commit to each alerting system's command, even with small uncertainties
of the operating environment and disturbance of the human operator's response, each
alerting system alone should have been designed to efficiently avoid the monitored
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hazard. An example alerting space and the monitored hazard space are presented in the
state space in Figure 5.1. As shown in this figure, when the continuous state hits the
boundary of alert space, the alerting system will command the human operator to take
some maneuver. The trajectory followed as commanded with small disturbance would be
able to avoid the hazard space.
state space
Alert space
Figure 5.1 State Space Representation of Alerting System for Hazard
With multiple alerting systems in the same process, it's possible to have
dissonance, and the human operator may lead the process to a hazard because of
dissonance. The dissonance space can be identified with the method developed in
Chapter 3 and 4. Figure 5.2 shows an example of process with two alerting systems, and
the dissonance space is the space where both systems alert but with dissonance resolution
advisories. As shown in Figure 5.2, the human operator's possible response to
dissonance could lead the process to a hazard. In Figure 5.2, the human operator follows
the first alerting system command after the continuous state hits the first alerting system
alert space boundary (at point A). But before the process gets out of the first alerting
system alert space, the continuous state hits the second alerting system alert space
boundary (at point B), where the second alerting system commands the operator to take
some maneuver that is dissonant with the first alerting system command. Different
operators may follow different trajectories in such a confusing situation, and some of
them may lead the process to hazard space. We define a dangerous dissonance state as a
state in dissonance space from which hazard space can be reached with a possible human
operator's response to dissonance. So, state B in Figure 5.2 is a dangerous dissonance
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state. We want to identify those dangerous dissonance states in dissonance space so that
the unsafe consequences of dissonance can be avoided.
state space
Dissonance space System 2
with opposite command
Figure 5.2 Uncertain Operator's Responses in Dissonance Space
As shown in Figure 5.3, dangerous dissonance space is a subset of the dissonance
space. Although the rest of the dissonance space is not dangerous, in the long-term view,
the human operator may still distrust the system. So, the system designer should at least
eliminate the dangerous dissonance space and if possible, all dissonance space.
state space
System I Dangerous System 2
dissonance space
Figure 5.3 Dangerous Dissonance Space
One way to identify the dangerous dissonance space is to predict the human
operators behavior given a specific dissonance situation. The set of possible trajectories
following dissonance can be the worst case of trajectory prediction or can be restricted by
the physical performance of the process. Then we can work forward to check if the
human's response could lead the process to any hazard. With such a forward reachability
analysis (Figure 5.4), we need to exhaustively check infinite states (which is impractical)
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System 1
in dissonance space with all possible
the dangerous dissonance states.
Dissonance
space-,
Dangerous
dissonance state
human operator responses numerically to determine
Set of possible trajectories
following dissonance
Figure 5.4 Forward Reachability Analysis
The other way to identify the dangerous dissonance space is to use backward
reachability analysis (Figure 5.5). Given the hazard space and the set of possible future
trajectories following dissonance, the dangerous dissonance space can be analytically
identified with backward reachability analysis. Backward reachability analysis can also
be used to identify the subset of human actions that could lead the process to the hazard
space.
Dangerous
dissonance space
Set of po sible trajectories
reaching hazard
Figure 5.5 Backward Reachability Analysis
Although it is impractical to predict the exact human operator's behavior in front
of specific dissonance, and it is hard to generalize a human's behavior for all dissonance
situations, we may be able to find a probabilistic distribution of human operator
responses through running an experiment or simulation. Or we can just assume that the
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set of future trajectories following dissonance is uniformly distributed and restricted by
the physical performance of the process.
In the following section, we will develop a model to accurately describe the
dynamic behavior of the process incorporating multiple alerting systems. Using the
hybrid model, dangerous dissonance space can be identified mathematically.
5.2 Hybrid Modelfor the Process Incorporating Multiple Alerting Systems
5.2.1 Introduction to Hybrid Systems
A Hybrid System is an interacting collection of dynamical systems, each
evolving on continuous state spaces, and subject to continuous and discrete controls, and
some other discrete phenomena (Branicky, et al., 1994). Hybrid models have been used
to describe complex systems to fully take into consideration the relations and interactions
of the continuous and discrete parts of the system. Examples of such systems include
robotics, chemical process control systems, manufacturing, automated highway systems,
air traffic management systems, integrated circuit design, and multi-media (Special issue
on hybrid systems, 1998, 1999, 2000).
The underlying mathematical theory behind hybrid systems combines models,
stability, and reachability analyses to prove safety and performance properties for
complex interactions. Formal analysis of hybrid systems is concerned with verifying
whether the hybrid system satisfies desired specifications. These specifications could be
safety specifications where it is important to guarantee that the state of the system avoid
certain unsafe regions. The specifications could also be reachability specifications,
where the problem is whether, under the dynamics of the hybrid system, a given set of
states can be reached from a given set of initial conditions. Techniques have been
developed for synthesizing controllers that satisfy safety specifications and establishing
whether the set of reachable states is contained in a certain set (Lynch, et al., 1996;
Lygeros, et al., 1999; Tomlin, et al., 2000; Koutsoukos, et al., 2000; Asarin, et al., 2000).
5.2.2 Hybrid Phenomenon of the Process Incorporating Multiple Alerting Systems
The process incorporating logical decision support subsystems can be considered
as a hybrid system, since the continuous and discrete dynamics coexist and interact with
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each other in the process. In (Branicky, et al., 1994) a unified hybrid systems model is
introduced, which captures many discrete phenomena arising in hybrid systems. These
phenomena include autonomous switching, which is the phenomenon where the vector
field defining the continuous dynamics changes discontinuously when the continuous
state hits certain boundaries, and controlled switching when the vector field changes
abruptly in response to a control command.
The hybrid phenomenon appearing in a process incorporating alerting systems is a
combination of autonomous and controlled switching. The switching of the vector field
governing the continuous dynamics is activated when the continuous state hits boundaries
defined by the threshold functions of the alerting systems. Ultimately, the vector field
switches in response to the human operator's discrete control strategy for the process
based on alerting system advisories. A method is needed to model this autonomously
activated but controlled switching phenomenon.
5.2.3 Hybrid Model with Transition Functions
To be able to model the hybrid phenomenon described above, transition functions
are introduced to model human operator responses to alerting system commands. The
transition functions are activated when the continuous state hits a boundary satisfying
alerting system threshold functions. Human operators are assumed to follow the alerting
system commands with some uncertainties in each alerting system's alert space
individually, and these uncertainties can be included in a small set of disturbances on the
set of trajectories determined by the alerting system's command. The transition function
in each alerting system's alert space acts as a random processor, randomly choosing one
trajectory from the set of trajectories determined by the alerting system command. Since
we assumed each alerting system has been well designed to avoid hazard space, the
switched vector field governing the continuous dynamics will not reach the hazards. In
the dissonance space, since human operator responses are more uncertain, we assume that
the possible set of trajectories in dissonance space are probabilistically distributed and
bounded by the worst case or the physical performance of the process. That is, the
switched vectored field is not determined but belongs to a probabilistic distributed set
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(Figure 5.6).
choosing one
The transition function in dissonance space acts as a random processor,
trajectory from the probabilistic distributed set of trajectories.
Figure 5.6 Transition Functions in Dissonance Space
Mathematically, given the io' alerting system, at any time t, we can separate the
whole state space U into several subsets Ak based on the system alert stages of the i*
alerting system,
U = UAk
k (5.1)
Where each Ak is a connected, open set of R" . R" is the continuous state space of the
process. Ak is the k' system alert stage space of the i* alerting system, as defined in
chapter 2.
For the i alerting system, the continuous dynamics in each discrete state space
Ak is given by a set of vector fields F: A1k -) R", which is based on the allowed
action space of the i alerting system, governed by the differential equation
i(t) = fik (x(t), u(t), d(t), t) e Fik (5.2)
where u(t) is the continuous control applied to the process at time t while the alerting
system is in alert stage k , and d(t) is the disturbance at time t.
Given two alerting systems i and j, as we introduced in Chapter 2, the
intersections of their alert stages are denoted by the sets Sn, where m is the alert stage
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state space Probabilistic distributed set of
trajectories in dissonance space
Set oftrajectories in individual
system aleit space based on allowed action space
from system i and n is the alert stage from systemj. The whole state space then can be
separated into subsets Sm, that is,
U = U Smn = U(A,,,n Ajn) (5.3)
m,n m,n
If S, is not a dissonance space, then the continuous dynamics of the process is governed
by
Fn = F,, r Fjn (5.4)
which is defined by the intersection of the two alerting systems' allowed action space.
But if Smn is a dissonance space, the intersection of two alerting systems' allowed action
space may be empty. That is, Fn = F,, n Fj, = 0. In this case, Fn is not well defined
in the dissonance space. Exposed to this situation, the confused human operator might
take any action, and the continuous dynamics would be given by a set F of differential
operators. F could be uniformly distributed and bounded by the physical performance of
the process, or could be a probabilistic distributed set and bounded by the worst case
describing the human operator's response in dissonance space. This set could be
determined through running an experiment or simulation. The transition functions in
space Smn act as a random processor, which randomly chooses a governing differential
operator from the set Fn if Smn is not a dissonance space or F if Smn is a dissonance
space.
For example, given two alerting systems A and B with threshold functions shown
in state space as the physical space in Figure 5.7, both have two alert stages 0 and 1.
There are four subsets in the whole state space: SOO = AAO r) ABO, Sol= AAO r-AB
Si0 =AAl r) ABO, and S 1 = AAl n ABI. When system A is in alert stage 1, system A
commands a right turn within the set of required heading changes; and in alert stage 0,
there is no restriction for the action space. When system B is in alert stage 1, system B
commands a left turn within the set of required heading changes; and no action restriction
in alert stage 0. So, when the continuous state hits the boundary of subset
S 10 = AAl r) ABO, the transition function is activated which randomly chooses a governing
differential equation within the intersection set of allowed action spaces of two alerting
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systems Flo = FAl r FBO = FAl. This would be some form of right turn. When the
continuous state hits the boundary of subset SI, = AAl r ABl, the activated transition
function randomly chooses a governing differential equation within set F, which is
bounded by the mechanical performance of the process (e.g., the maximum turn the
process could have). When the continuous state hits the boundary of subset
Sol = AA0 r) ABI, the activated transition function randomly chooses a governing
differential equation within set Fol = FAO r FBI = FBI, which would be a left turn. It is
assumed here that the effect of dissonance on the operator's choice of control does not
continue into the non-dissonance region Sol.
state space f EFO, =FBI
f F
feFIO=FAI rnFBO =FAI
Figure 5.7: Example Transition Function
Now we can define the hybrid model of the process incorporating multiple
alerting systems. The model consists of a state space
U= U Uq Q ={1,...,N} (5.5)qEQ
Where each Uq is a connected, open set of R" . R" is the continuous state space of the
hybrid process, and Q ={1,..., N} is the set of discrete states. A state of the process is a
pair (q, x) e Q x U. B is the boundary associated with each discrete state, meaning that
the state (q, x) may flow within q only if x o B, and when x e B , transition function
T is activated, a discrete transition is forced, and the continuous dynamics within the
following discrete state q' is decided by the transition function. In each discrete state q,
the continuous state x e SMn. The continuous dynamics are given by vector fields
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f :Uq -+ R" as decided by transition functions. The model also includes H, , the hazard
space monitored by the ith alerting system. The state of the process (q, x) is required to
stay outside the hazard space H, .
Since the human operator's response has some time delay, we use Aq to represent
the transition delay. The dynamics of the hybrid process can now be described as follows.
There is a sequence of pre-switch times {r, } and another sequence of post-switch times
{],}- satisfying <r = TO ' < F1 < r2 < F2 < ... oo, such that on each interval [Fj,,r)
with a non-empty interior, x(.) evolves according to the differential equations i(t) = f
decided by transition function T in some U,. At the next pre-switch time (say, rI ), x()
hits the boundary B, and the vector field switches according to transition functions at
time F. =r+A,.
U
S
Uk
UU
.su.
SIO SO,
Figure 5.8: Example Dynamics of the Hybrid Model
Part of the dynamics of the example we introduced above (in Figure 5.7) is shown
in Figure 5.8. The state (q,, x) flows within q, before rj; at time zj, the state hits the
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boundary of SI, and the activated transition function chooses a governing differential
equation from Flo = FAI within time delay A,. During the time delay A,, the state
(q,, x) still flows within q, governed by differential equation i(t) = f e FOO as before T.
At time Fj = r1 + A,, the process is in discrete state q1 , on interval [1F7 , rk), and x(-)
evolves according to the differential equations i(t) = f decided by transition function T
in Uj; and the process dynamics continue.
5.2 Unsafe Consequences of Dissonance
As mentioned above, some subset of the trajectories following dissonance may
encounter hazards, although each alerting system has been designed to be able to avoid
the monitored hazard individually. Using backward reachability analysis of the hybrid
model we developed above, we can identify those dangerous dissonance spaces in which
the human operator's possible response could lead the process to some hazards. Here, we
assume the hazard spaces are metric spaces, and the set of functions Fn, and F are all
monotonic, then from the boundary of the hazard spaces, the boundary of the dangerous
dissonance space can be identified through backward reachability analysis.
Continuing the example given in the last section, the process to identify
dangerous dissonance space can be described with Figure 5.9. First consider those
continuous dynamics hitting the boundary of the dissonance space S 1 from Si . That is,
the continuous state first hits the boundary of Sl0; following flo e Flo, the continuous
state then hits the boundary of the dissonance space SH . Following the set of possible
differential operators F in dissonance space, some of these trajectories hit the hazard
spaces. For the hazard space HB monitored by alerting system B (Figure 5.9 (a)), with
HB as the initial conditions, the states between A and B can be identified by solving the
set of differential equations - i(t) = F1 (x(-t), u(-t), d(t),-i) at time Fq. Any state
between A and B could then encounter HB .Also, with the hazard space HAmonitored
by alerting system A as the initial conditions, the states between C and D can be
identified by solving the set of differential equations - i(t) = Flo (x(-t), u(-t), d(t),-t) at
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time Fq. Now, those dangerous dissonance states between J and K (Figure 5.9 (b)) in
dissonance space can be identified by solving the set of differential equations
- i(t) = F(x(-t), u(-t),d(t),-t) at time Fq,, with those states between A and B, and C
and D as initial conditions. The dangerous dissonance space on the dissonance space
boundary (between X and Y) can then be identified with one more backward step,
solving the set of differential equations - i(t) = Flo (x(-t), u(-t), d(t),-t) at time rq-1
with the states between J and K as initial conditions (Figure 5.9 (c)). The dangerous
dissonance space is then that dissonant space that could be reached from the dangerous
dissonance states between X and Y.
State space
SioA
Si B(a)
Sol
State space
(b)
State space
Dangerous -
dissona states
(c)
SIO Sol
Figure 5.9: Identification of Dangerous Dissonance Space
After identifying dangerous dissonance space, the dangerous effect of dissonance
now can be avoided through modifying one or both alerting system designs to eliminate
the dangerous dissonance space. Due to restrictions on each system's performance
requirements, if the alerting system design cannot be modified to eliminate the dangerous
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dissonance space, we need to identify what control procedures could be used to avoid the
dangerous effects of dissonance. That is, we need to identify what is the subset of the
differential operators in set F in dissonance space following which the hazard spaces
could still be avoided. Or, we could determine what is the proper alerting system
command that could avoid entering the dangerous dissonance space. These mitigation
methods are presented in Chapter 6.
5.3 Summary
This chapter developed a hybrid model to describe the interactions between the
discrete state of alerting systems and the continuous dynamics of the process
incorporating multiple alerting systems. The concept of a transition function has been
introduced to model the human operator's response to alerting system alerts individually
and to the dissonant commands in dissonance space.
Because of the unpredictable response of a human operator to dissonance, the
process could be led to hazards. That is, there would be a dangerous effect of dissonance.
The concept of a dangerous dissonance state has been defined. The method has been
developed to identify the dangerous dissonance space that includes all dangerous
dissonance states in dissonance space.
As the dangerous dissonance space is being identified, the unsafe consequences of
dissonance can be avoided by changing the logic design of the alerting systems to
eliminate the dangerous dissonance space, or by restricting alerting system commands to
avoid entering the dangerous dissonance space once in alert space, or by restricting the
human operator's discrete control to avoid the hazard spaces once in dangerous
dissonance space. These options are presented in Chapter 6 in more detail.
A similar method as used for dangerous effects of dissonance can also be used to
avoid other negative effects of dissonance. For instance, inefficient dissonance space can
be identified in which the human operator's response could cause the operation to
become inefficient. Also restrictions could be given on the human operator's response
(chosen from differential operators governing continuous dynamics) in inefficient
dissonance space to guarantee that the process stays inside the efficient operating space.
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Or the alerting system resolution advisories could be restricted in alert space to prevent
the process from entering the inefficient dissonance space.
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6. Avoiding and/or Mitigating Dissonance
As we stated in Chapter 5, when exposed to dissonance, the confused human
operator may lead the process to an accident or suffer inefficient/unnecessary operation.
The human operator may distrust the alerting system after several dissonant situations
happened. So, dissonance should be avoided or mitigated, or at least, the dangerous
consequences of dissonance should be avoided.
In this chapter, we suggest several ways to avoid or mitigate dissonance. Each
way has its advantages and disadvantages. Mitigation methods should be chosen based
on the specific performance requirement of the alerting system designs. Also, different
mitigation methods may be required for different dissonance situations or under different
circumstances for the same alerting systems.
6.1 Prioritization
To date, dissonance between automation has been largely managed through
prioritization. Each alerting system can be prioritized, and if more than one alerting
system is triggered, the lower priority alerts may be inhibited or only displayed passively
(i.e., without separate attention-getting signals). Several complex prioritization schemes
have been investigated for the various alerting systems on board an aircraft (Boucek, et
al., 1981; Berson, et al., 1981).
The Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), for example, uses
measurements of the height of the aircraft above terrain to predict whether there is a
threat of collision with terrain. Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
warns the pilots to an immediate collision with other aircraft and provides escape
commands and guidance. TCAS and GPWS, while alerting pilots of conditions outside
the aircraft, are separate systems and are aimed at different specific conditions. When
both TCAS and GPWS detect a hazard (other aircraft and terrain), only a GPWS alert
will be presented to the pilot, since terrain is given a higher priority than other air traffic,
with the rationale that all else being equal, it is less likely that an aircraft would collide
with another aircraft than it would hit terrain.
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In (Ververs, et al., 1999), alert prioritization was proposed to consider both the
critical nature of the condition to maintaining a safe mission and the time until the
condition is encountered. Each alert is prioritized into one of three categories using the
dimensions identified in Figure 6.1 (Ververs, et al., 1999). The lines in the diagram are
purely conceptual.
High
Time-
Critical
> Tactical
Strategic
Low
Short AVAILABLE TIME Long
Figure 6.1 Alert Prioritization (Ververs, 1999)
As described in (Ververs, et al. 1999) for Figure 6.1, time-critical alerts are
assumed to be highly critical, and need immediate attention of the flight crew, thus are
put in highest priority. Time-critical alerts are defined to concern problems that lie
within a 60-second time window. When a time-critical situation arises, the crew is
presented with a correlated aural/visual alert that is designed to quickly direct their
attention to the nature and location of the threat and also to command the pilot on what
actions to take to evade the threat.
Tactical alerts, which are concerned with problems that may affect the mission
within 10 minutes (Ververs, et al., 1999), are assumed to have less urgency than time-
critical alerts, but still require the pilot's attention to the situation, and have a high
probability of requiring pilot response in the near future. A repeating non-verbal aural
alert is used to inform the crew that there is a tactical situation. In addition to the aural
alert, corresponding visual information is provided to the crew that describes the nature
of the alert in more detail.
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Strategic alerts address problems that are at least 10 minutes away and those that
are probabilistic, such as, a weather cell that is near the destination that is moving away
from the airport or pilot reports of windshear. While this strategic information is
important to the overall situation awareness of the crew for planning and informed
decisions, the notification system for strategic information must be designed such that the
crew does not have their current tasks interrupted, or be overloaded with new
information. Therefore, subtle yet informative aural and visual alerts are needed to allow
the crew to decide whether or not they will address the situation then, or at a later time,
depending on their current workload.
The other way prioritization comes into play is to resolve a conflict within the
threat levels themselves. We need to consider the criticality of the hazard within the
levels. The most problematic hazard is considered to be the most critical one. For
example, the effects of turbulence may be less critical than wind shear, so the alert for
wind shear is put in higher priority than the alert for turbulence. Another example is that
if two time-critical alerts get triggered - TCAS and GPWS, which one has higher
priority? There is a prioritization assigned to each type of alert with time-critical alerts.
In general, GPWS has a higher priority than TCAS with the reason that it is less likely
that an aircraft would collide with another aircraft than it would hit terrain. Similarly,
TCAS placed at a higher priority than convective weather. Within the other levels
(tactical and strategic), the alerts are prioritized by the time they come into the queue with
the most recent given the highest priority.
Prioritization can run into trouble, however, if two alerts are both valid but the
operator is only receiving or responding to one. When TCAS and GPWS alerts are both
valid, the probability of collision with other aircraft still exists when the pilot is taking a
maneuver according to the GPWS command. Also, it would be difficult to "undo" an
earlier alert if the higher-priority system acts later. For example, if GPWS gives a
command to climb when the pilot is already taking a descent maneuver according to a
previous TCAS alert, it may be hard for the pilot to mentally cancel the descent maneuver
that is being taken. This may ultimately cause an accident. Finally, the prioritization
schemes can be quite complex. Consider the fact that the number of warning displays
increased from 188 on the Boeing 707 to over 450 on the Boeing 747 (Hawkins, 1987).
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Still, prioritization can help reduce sensory and cognitive overload of the human during a
time of high stress.
Prioritization is somewhat like modifying one of alerting system's designs to
avoid dissonance (Figure 6.2), since one of the alerting systems is inhibited so that only
one alert is effective in the dissonance space. But prioritization is not actually changing
the internal alerting system threshold functions, as presented in the next section.
I Prioritize system 2
Figure 6.2 State-Space Representation of Prioritization
(System 2 Placed at Higher Priority Than System 1)
6.2 Modify System Design
It may be necessary to modify the design of the alerting logic or algorithm in the
new (or existing) alerting system to reduce the potential for dissonance as much as
possible, especially those regions of dangerous dissonance space identified in Chapter 5.
If the threshold functions of alerting systems can be expressed explicitly in state
space, given the conditions for dissonance space the threshold functions could be
reshaped to eliminate the dissonance space or at least the dangerous dissonance space.
But the reshaping of threshold functions may affect the satisfaction of other performance
requirements.
84
For example, in Figure 6.3 (a), system 1 was designed to monitor some kind of
hazard, which is presented as hazard space inside alert space of system 1 in state space
representation, and system 2 was designed to avoid other kinds of hazard. There is
dissonance space with the original alerting systems' threshold functions, where both
systems alert but provide dissonant resolution advisories. If we change the threshold
function of system 1 to eliminate dissonance space, the safety requirement of system 1
may not be able to be satisfied (Figure 6.3 (b)). That is, the original designed evading
maneuver in new alert space of system 1 may not be able to avoid the monitored hazard,
as the example shown in Figure 6.3 (b). If we change the threshold function of system 2
to eliminate the dissonance space, the safety requirement of system 2 may not be able to
be satisfied (Figure 6.3 (c)).
state space
System 1 System 2
Reshape alert space (a) ' Reshape alert space
fr hazard I f r hazard 2
state space state space
New alert space of system 1 New alert space of system 2
(b) (c)
Figure 6.3 Reshape Threshold Functions to Eliminate Dissonance Space
Designing an alerting system to compromise with other alerting systems can be
considered a multi-objective optimization problem. The multi-objective optimization
problem is to find the optimum that maximizes or minimizes a multitude of objectives
subject to a number of constraints and bounds.
min G(x) =[g,(x),..., g,(x),..., g,,(x)]T (6.1)
xeRc
Subject to
h, (x) =0 i= .. q (6.2)
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r1(x) ! O j=1,..., p (6.3)
X'<Xk x" k=1,...,n (6.4)
Where the components of the objective function vector,
G(x) = [g (x),..., g, (x),..., g, (x)]T, are usually incommensurate and in conflict with one
another with respect to their minimum points. For the example shown in Figure 6.3, the
objective function vector could have three components: g, (x), minimizing the
probability of dissonance, g2 (x), minimizing the probability of missed detection of
hazard 1, and g3 (x), minimizing the probability of missed detection of hazard 2. These
three components are in conflict with one another as shown in Figure 6.3. The design
vector, x = [xI ,..., x,..., x,], consists of all design variables in the problem may be
bounded in Equation (6.4). The collection of equality constraints,
H(x) = [h, (x),..., h, (x),..., h, (x)]T, is an equality constraint vector, and similarly the
inequality constrain vector, R(x) = [r, (x),..., rj (x),..., rp (x)]T . For the example shown in
Figure 6.3, the safety requirement for both systems can be expressed as equality and/or
inequality constraints of some design variables (for instance, range and range rate
between two vehicles).
Given the condition for dangerous dissonance space, mitigating dangerous
dissonance space can be introduced as a component of the objective function vector in
multi-objective problem. That is, one objective is to minimize the size of the dangerous
dissonance space or the probability of dangerous consequences of dissonance. It also can
be introduced as components of equality and/or inequality constraint vectors.
Since the components of the objective function vector are competing in general,
there is generally no unique solution to this problem. The purpose of this problem is to
search for a best compromise solution to ensure objectives are close to their
corresponding preference points as much as possible. For the example shown in Figure
6.3, the safety and elimination of dissonance space may compete against each other, but
we can search for the best solution to ensure these objectives are close to their
corresgponding preference points.
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6.3 Modify Operational Procedures to Avoid Dissonance
As long as the conditions for dissonance between alerting systems have been
identified, it may be possible to modify the operation of the process so that dissonance is
unlikely to occur. One means of trying to ensure compatibility of a parallel approach
alerting system with TCAS, for example, is to modify air traffic control procedures to
decrease the likelihood of a simultaneous TCAS alert and parallel traffic alert. That is,
giving restrictions to other departing and arriving aircraft when two aircraft are parallel
approaching, so that if a blunder happens, the evading trajectory won't trigger TCAS
alerts. The identified conditions for dissonance can be used as restrictions to other
departing and arriving aircraft.
A request to pilots to reduce their vertical speed as the aircraft nears a target
altitude, for example, is one operational change that has already been made to help reduce
the likelihood of dissonance between TCAS false alarms and air traffic controllers. For
example, in Figure 6.4, aircraft A is descending to some target altitude above the aircraft
B. The high descent rate of aircraft A may trigger a TCAS alert and command aircraft B
to climb, which is a false alarm and may cause collision after aircraft B climbs and
aircraft A levels off. This is an observed common source of dissonance between air
traffic controllers and TCAS. The solution that has been put in place is to train pilots to
reduce vertical speed when approaching their assigned altitude.
Possible
collision 
High
vertical rate
TCAS
command
TCAS
False Alarm
Figure 6.4 Reduce Vertical Speed to Avoid Dissonance
6.4 Modify Control Strategy
After identifying dangerous dissonance space using the hybrid model developed
in Chapter 5, the dangerous effect of dissonance can be avoided by modifying the control
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strategy of the process. That is, we can identify the subset of the differential operators of
set F in dissonance space, following which the hazard spaces can be avoided; or the
proper alerting system command that could avoid entering the dangerous dissonance
space.
With the dangerous dissonance states as initial conditions, and the states between
A and B, and C and D (Figure 6.5) as the target states, the subset FD of the differential
operators set F in dissonance space can be identified, following which the hazard space
can not be avoided. Then the subset F - FD includes differential operators in dangerous
dissonance space that will avoid the hazard spaces. Thus, if the dangerous dissonance
space can not be eliminated in the alerting system design, then human operators can be
given certain operating command in dangerous dissonance space such that the continuous
dynamics would be given by the differential operators in set F - FD .
Figure 6.5 shows an example of restricted trajectories in dangerous dissonance
space to avoid the hazards. Given a dangerous dissonance state P, part of the original
restricted set of trajectories intersects the states between A and B, which will lead the
process to the hazard space. After identifying the dangerous subset FD of the original
differential operators set F in dissonance space, the trajectories governed by those
differential operators in subset F - FD (e.g., turn right at least 30 degrees or turn left at
least 25 degrees) would be able to avoid both hazards monitored by both alerting
systems.
Sets of safe trajectories
System I
,D System 2
Dangerous dissonance space
Figure 6.5 Restricted Trajectories
in Dangerous Dissonance Space to Avoid Hazards
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Another way to avoid the dangerous effect of dissonance is to modify the alerting
system command (the allowed action space) such that the continuous dynamics in alert
space of each alerting system would not hit dangerous dissonance space. With the alert
space boundary of each alerting system as initial conditions, and the dangerous
dissonance states as target states, the subset of differential operators in alert space F,,D
can be identified, following which the continuous dynamics would hit the dangerous
dissonance space. Then the continuous dynamics given by any differential operator in set
F,,, - F nD can avoid the dangerous dissonance space, and thus the dangerous effect of
dissonance space.
Figure 6.6 shows an example of modified evading trajectories. Given an alert
state P in alert space of system 1, the original set of evading trajectories according to the
alerting system's resolution advisories (e.g., turn left at least 10 degrees) is entering the
dangerous dissonance space. After modifying the resolution advisories (e.g., turn left at
least 30 degrees), the corresponding evading trajectories governed by any differential
operator in set F,, - FnD would be able to avoid both hazards monitored by both
alerting systems since it is not entering the dangerous dissonance space.
Modified evading trajectories to
avoid entering dangerous dissonance space
F,,,,- FmnrD
System2
System I
Original commanded trajectories
to avoid hazard in alert space F,,
Figure 6.6 Modify Evading Trajectories to Avoid Unsafe Effect of Dissonance
6.5 Modify Procedures Under Dissonance
A final way to mitigate dissonance between alerting systems is through
procedures for responding to dissonance. The human operators can be trained to know
exactly how the alerting systems work. Then if any dissonance happens, they know why
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it happened and how to deal with it. Pilots are trained, for example, that EGPWS and
GPWS use different decision-making logic, and that alerts from the two systems may not
occur in concert.
Dissonance may still be perceived if the logic or sensor error differences result in
situations different from the trained situation. Continuing EGPWS and GPWS as the
example, EGPWS is designed to provide an earlier warning of terrain proximity than
GPWS. Should this happen, there is no perceived dissonance for the trained pilots. But
if the opposite occurred, there may be perceived dissonance because the pilot may not
understand why EGPWS does not rate the terrain as a threat while GPWS does.
In more severe cases, however, training may fall short. For instance, two
accidents of Boeing B757 aircraft in 1996 (the first near Puerto Plata, Dominican
Republic, and the second near Lima, Peru) involved simultaneous, dissonant alerts in the
cockpit. Both accidents were caused by clogged air data systems that resulted in alerts
that the aircraft was flying too fast (from one system) and too slow (from a second,
independent system). This led to significant confusion in the cockpit as to which alert to
believe, and ultimately led to the accidents.
The control strategy may not have to be modified in system design as we
described in section 6.4 as long as the safe set of maneuvers is identified. The human
operator could be trained to take a safe maneuver in dangerous dissonance space (for
example, turning at least 30 degrees) such that the continuous dynamics would be given
by the differential operators in set F -FD, which can avoid hazards although the process
has been in dangerous dissonance space.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, several methods to avoid or mitigate dissonance were suggested
from different points of view. Each of these methods has its own advantages and
disadvantages. The mitigation method should be chosen depending on the characteristics
of different alerting systems and different kinds of dissonance situations. There is no
absolute best solution for all dissonance situations. To actually select mitigation method
requires more information on the frequencies of the dissonance, the effects of dissonance
on human operators, and the cost of each mitigation method, etc.
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Each of these mitigation methods incurs some costs as far as overall system
performance is concerned. For example, prioritization and inhibition essentially hide part
of the available information from the operator. This reduces the benefit of having the
additional alerting system components, since their information is not transmitted to the
operator. Reducing the likelihood of dissonance by modifying the process' operation
(e.g., increasing separation between vehicles to reduce alert probability) may decrease
overall system capability. Finally, modifying the design of the logic is complex, costly,
and may have other negative impacts on system performance. To minimize these
negative effects, mitigation strategies should only be employed where necessary. That is
one reason why we need to identify the dangerous dissonance space from Chapter 5.
Methods should be chosen to mitigate those negative effects of dissonance with the least
overall cost to system performance.
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7. Example Application: In-Trail Spacing
In this chapter, we use a conceptual In-Trail separation example to demonstrate
the framework of dissonance modeling and analysis we developed in previous chapters.
We are then interested to identify when and where dissonance could occur through
formally describing the threshold functions of the alerting systems involved; identify the
dissonance originating from the sensor errors and compare it with the contribution of
logic differences; identify the dangerous dissonance space by establishing a hybrid model
of the process; and apply the methods outlined in Chapter 6 to avoid or mitigate
dissonance.
Consider a simplified one-dimensional problem in which the in-trail separation of
two vehicles is monitored by two independent alerting systems placed in the trailing
vehicle. As a baseline, assume that system 1 is set up to issue an alert if the two vehicles
get too far apart. An alert from system 1 would command the trailing operator to
accelerate to reduce the separation between vehicles, to satisfy a requirement of spacing.
System 2 is set up to alert if the vehicles are projected to be too close within some
amount of time, or if the vehicles are very close together and not diverging fast enough.
An alert from system 2 would command the trailing operator to decelerate and increase
separation, to satisfy a safety requirement (Figure 7.1). The leading vehicle (vehicle 1)
follows some path open-loop, while the trailing vehicle (vehicle 0) may receive alerts to
speed up or slow down to maintain spacing.
range
0_
range rate
System 1: Command aircraft 0 to accelerate if range > threshold
System 2: Command aircraft 0 to decelerate if time to impact < threshold
Figure 7.1 In-Trail Example
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It is a conceptual example since the dynamics of the process and the threshold
functions of two alerting systems are much simpler than a real system. However, through
this example, we can demonstrate all the dissonance issues presented in the previous
chapters and apply the modeling and analysis tools we developed to analyze and mitigate
the dissonance.
Although it is a conceptual example, there are real applications in the air traffic
control area. Increased demand for air travel translates into a need to accommodate more
aircraft in the terminal airspace. Separation between aircraft pairs must be small enough
to be efficient while remaining sufficiently large to be safe. Researchers have
investigated the feasibility of performing in-trail spacing by pilots, and pilots suggested
technology enhancements such as display of other aircraft airspeed or automated speed-
up/slow-down cues (Pritchett & Yankosky, 2000).
7.1 Dissonance Originating from Logic Differences
In this example, the positions and velocities of the two vehicles make up the
complete state space:
x = [xo, Xi, vo, vi]T (7.1)
where [xo, vo]T is the state of the trailing (own) aircraft, and [ x1,vi]T is the state of the
front (other) aircraft.
System 1 measures only the range between the vehicles, while system 2 uses both
the range and range rate. So,
yi = [r] = [xi - xo] = G 1x
Y2= [r, -]T = [Xi -xO, vi - vo]T = G2 x (7.2)
This example has a simple, binary alert stage for each system: 0 or 1. System 1
alerts (ai = 1) when the range between vehicles is greater than a threshold distance R1. In
the notation we have developed, predicates (or inequalities) denoted f are defined to
divide the state space into subsets. When the state is inside the subset, the predicate is
true; when outside, the predicate is false. Combinations of these subsets then form the
alert stage space within the universe of the state space, U. Each resulting subset is
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denoted A1k for the kt alert stage of system i. So, for system 1, an alert occurs when the
state is in region A 11. The threshold function is then formally defined as:
f11 r > R1
T = A = f1  (7.3)
LA10 = U -A
According to equation (7.3), an alert is issued (state is in A 11) when conditionfiI
is true; this is equivalent to r> R1. Otherwise, the state is in region A10, which indicates
that system 1 is in alert stage 0.
System 2 alerts (a2 = 1) when the vehicles are converging and projected to be less
than a range R2 apart within r seconds, or if they are close together and diverging but at
a slow rate (r * < H, where H is some constant). So, four predicates are needed to
separate the alert space A21 from the universal state space U,
f2 : < 0 (7.4)
f22 r .R2 < (7.5)
r
f21: r* < H (7.6)
f24 :r < R2 (7.7)
This is similar to the logic used by TCAS (RTCA, 1983). Thus, for system 2, the
threshold function is formally defined as:
f 21 i < 0
r -R2f22: <V
f23 ri < H
T= (7.8)
f24 r < R2
A 21 = (f21 rf 22) U (f23 r f 24)
A20 =U - A2 1
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Figure 7.2 shows the two alerting systems' alert spaces in the two-dimensional y
space of r and r . A "+" has been added to the active alert stage in the diagram for
system 1 to emphasize that an alert from that system commands the trailing operator to
increase speed. A "0" implies that no command or guidance information is displayed by
the alerting system. A "-" is used to show where a command to reduce speed would be
given by system 2.
A31A 1-
(No command)
02
(No command)
System 1 System 2
Figure 7.2: Example In-Trail Separation Alert Stage Mapping
7.1.1 Possible Perceived Dissonance
Having set up the basic alert stage regions in state space, we can analyze the two
systems together as shown in Figure 7.3. We assume that the range threshold for
efficient operation would be larger than the range threshold for the safety requirement,
that is, R1 > R 2 . When the two systems are combined, the intersections of their alert
stages are denoted by the sets Sm where m is the alert stage from system 1 and n is the
alert stage from system 2:
Smn =Aim n A2n (7.9)
There are four possible combinations of alert spaces between the two systems:
Soo = A10 n A2 0, SO, = A 10 n A21 , SIO =A n A 20, and S 1 = All n A2 . To help identify
potential dissonance, the "+", "-", or "0" notations from Figure 7.2 have been carried
through in Figure 7.3. The notation, "+0", for example, indicates that system 1
commands an acceleration while system 2 does not display any command information.
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Figure 7.3: Combined In-Trail Alert Stages
To better visualize the potential perceived dissonance, consider Figure 7.4, which
shows the one-dimensional space of potential acceleration actions by the trailing vehicle
for each alerting condition. Assume there is some limit on the potential acceleration of
the vehicle, am. If System 1 is not alerting, then the operator is conceivably allowed to
apply any acceleration he or she may desire within that acceleration limit. Thus, stage
A 10 can be thought of mapping to the action space [-am. ama]. If System 1 does alert,
then the operator should accelerate the trailing vehicle above amin. This corresponds to
the action space [amin am.]. Similar mappings can be made for System 2. System 2 has
the same action space as System 1 if there is no alert. However, an alert from System 2
commands the trailing vehicle to decelerate with the magnitude of the deceleration above
amin, corresponding to action space [-am. - amin]
With this notation, then, it is possible to observe perceived dissonance situations.
For example, S 1 is a perceived dissonance region because the intersection of the two
systems' action spaces { [amin ama ] and [-ama -amin ]} is empty. That is, the two
systems are issuing contradictory resolution commands (one to accelerate, the other to
decelerate). The condition for this perceived dissonance space is,
S = fl r f2 l n f 2 2 ={(r,i) I < ,r > R2 ,r -R2 < 4} (7.10)
Regions Soi and Sio would probably not be perceived as dissonance, because the
intersection of their action spaces is not empty. Although there is a disagreement in alert
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stages in Sol and SIO, the two systems have different roles and so would not be expected
to operate simultaneously. So, "+0" or "0-" conditions would likely be acceptable.
The "+ -" dissonance in region S 1 could be quite problematic. This corresponds
to a case in which the vehicles are rather far apart but closing rapidly. The operator
receives one alert to accelerate (from system 1) while system 2 is simultaneously
commanding the operator to decelerate. Depending on the relative strengths with which
these commands are issued, the operator may be uncertain as to the correct action to take.
System 1 System 2
acceptable acceleration range acceptable acceleration range
No Alert -a, 0 aax -a... 0 anx
A10  A20
acceptable acceleration range acceptable acceleration range
Alert I 0 6 ~ *~ 6 I0
-a,., 0 ain aax -a.. -a,,,, 0 ax
A11 A2 1
Figure 7.4 Action Spaces for Alerting Situations
7.1.2 Dynamic Analysis
The analysis above for dissonance does not completely describe the interactions
between the two systems. It is also necessary to examine the process dynamics to see
how dissonance may evolve over time.
Here, we assume two aircraft are flying on the same straight line, so the thrust To
is the only control input. To simplify the case study, we assume that the front aircraft
does not change its velocity, and the trailing aircraft changes velocity constantly
according to each system's alert space. A Point-Mass equation of motion is adequate to
analyze dissonance in this case.
Thus, the dynamics of the whole process for this one-dimensional case can be
described as
= V0
il = V1
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O =7To /mO (7.11)
'1 =0
where mo is the mass of the trailing aircraft.
For this example, we can get x(t) by integration, that is,
x (t ) = xO(0)+vo(0)t +-aot 2
2
x, (t) = x, (0) + v, (O)t + Iait2 (7.12)
2
vO (t) = vo (0) + aot
v,(t)= v,(0)+ alt
With ao = To /mo , a, = 0 , and the initial state [xO (0), vo (0)]' for the trailing aircraft and
[x1 (0), vI ( 0 )]T for the front aircraft.
In observable state space (r, *), the trajectory of the process is given by
r(t)= ro +ot+-I(a, -ao)t2 (7.13)
2
(t)=O + (a, - ao)t (7.14)
Where ro = x, (0) - x0 (0) and io = v, (0) - v0 (0). Now, we can analyze the dissonance
situation on (r, r) state space by examining the trajectories as time changes.
In this case, there is a specific physical coupling between the range and range-rate
states, meaning that only certain trajectories are possible. Specifically, it is impossible to
enter region Si1 from the left; by definition, the negative range rate indicates that the
range must be decreasing. So, the only way in which dynamic dissonance can occur is
for the range to be decreasing at a large rate while in region Si. In a specific problem,
the possible trajectories in the S,n, diagram can be examined to determine whether it is
possible to have the large range and closure-rates needed to enter region Si1 .
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As an example dynamic analysis, Figure 7.5 overlays several potential state
trajectories on the state space diagram. Assume that the process dynamics are such that
the relative speed between vehicles can be increased or decreased by an acceleration of
no more than a certain amount. Starting at the state denoted A in Figure 7.5, for example,
the future state trajectory must lie somewhere between the parabolic curves shown.
Consider now starting at state B. Here, the vehicles are diverging and the state
has just entered region S10. The trailing operator receives an alert from system 1 to speed
up and decrease spacing. If the vehicle is accelerated at its limit, the state will follow the
trajectory shown, just crossing past region S 1 through point C. If a lower magnitude of
acceleration were used, the trajectory would lie to the right of that shown and could
therefore enter region S 1.
The transition from region SIO to Sol that occurs at point C may initially appear to
be a case of dissonance. As Figure 7.6 shows, however, when transitioning from Sio to
Sol, there is a similar trend in the action spaces from each system suggesting a
deceleration. This implies that such a transition may not be perceived as dissonant since
the operator will have a consistent change in the acceleration level to apply.
200
kS
0
trajectoriesB
V 0
2000 4000 6000 range (f)
10C
-100 SoC
-200
Figure 7.5 Dynamical Trajectory Analysis
Similar dynamic analyses could be performed under different conditions and
assumptions. The general approach, however, is one in which potential paths through the
different alerting regions can be explored. This identifies what conditions may lead to
perceived dissonance. Additional effort can then be focused on those conditions to
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determine how likely they are, the impact of the dissonance, and to develop
countermeasures to reduce the effect of the dissonance on operator performance.
System I System 2
Start 9
-a,,= 0 ai am=x -amx 0 aM
End W i
-amax 0 am -amax -amin 0 a
Figure 7.6 Dynamic Changes in Alerting Actions From S10 to Sol
7.2 Dissonance Originating from Sensor Error
In the dissonance analysis of the previous section, we did not consider any
measurement error of the observable states, range and range rate. For a real alerting
system, sensor error always exists at some level. When two alerting systems use different
sensors to monitor the process, even if they have the same alerting threshold function or
resolution logic, they may be in different alert stages due to sensor error.
Considering the measurement error of measured states for both systems in this In-
Trail example, we are interested to identify the dissonance originating from sensor error,
and compare it with the dissonance originating from logic differences.
7.2.1 Threshold Function Distribution with the Measurement Error
Continuing the previous In-Trail example, system 1 measures only the range
between the vehicles, while system 2 uses both the range and range rate. Suppose the
measurement noises are normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation
O-,, for system 1 and o-,,,, O-,,, for system 2.
To examine the effect of error magnitude on dissonance, we use a generalized
sensor error model, with a single parameter to represent system-wide sensor accuracy
(Figure 7.7). That is, we assume
o-,, = o = K2 (7.15)
and
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an2 2 =(K /100) 2  (7.16)
Thus, a single parameter K is used to represent system-wide accuracy.
nrl
r nSystem 1 Alert stage from system 1
r System 2 ----- Alert stage from system 2
"r2
Figure 7.7 Example Sensor Error Model
For system 1, the threshold function is r = RI. So, for a given normally
distributed noise of the measurement with standard deviation - , we can recast the
problem into one in which P is normally distributed with mean m; = R, and standard
deviation o-i = -r .
For system 2, consider the function -2 = r , that is, r + ir = R2 . Let
s = r + ft, then if y = [r j]T,
s = [ j r. = Ay (7.17)
s is a linear function of range and range rate. So the mean of s can be expressed as
M_
= Am =[1 trl =m +m v (7.18)A m ~ ~ ~ 7 _ 1 M 2 r
Where mj and m, are equal to the measurement given by system 2, ^ and We
assume that range and range rate are not correlated, so the covariance of s can be
obtained from the following operation,
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2
[ j2 
-[ 2
07 =[ r2 2 = + 7o- 22
0 Je rr2
r2 _ - -
(7.19)
where o> = o-, , and - = o-, . Thus, we can obtain the redistribution the alert stager2  r s p e g 7
boundaries in negative range rate state space (Figure 7.8).
r
r±-z=R2
r
3ar-
33o
'.~s
Figure 7.8 Threshold Boundary Change Due to Sensor Error
7.2.2 Contribution of Sensor Error to Dissonance
As explained in Section 7.1, S1 is a perceived dissonant region, where the two
systems are issuing contradictory resolution commands (one to accelerate, the other to
decelerate). Here, we want to identify the contribution of sensor error to this conflict
resolution command dissonance, and compare it with the contribution of logic
differences.
For this example, we examine three different cases. First, for a given true state,
we identify the probability of that the measurement of the true state will result in
dissonance, and how the probability of dissonance changes as the measurement accuracy
(K) changes. Second, for a given complete true state trajectory, we identify the
cumulative probability of dissonance along the given trajectory. Finally, if the trajectory
is uncertain for a given initial state, we identify the overall cumulative probability of
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dissonance for a set of possible trajectories, and how the sensor accuracy affect the
probability of dissonance.
Given a true state (r, i), the probability of the true state causing a system 1 alert
is:
00
P (r) exp{- 2 r)2d (7.20)
2 'i2
R,
And the probability of the true state causing system 2 alert is:
R2
1 1
P2 1 (r,*)= exp{- 2 ( r -_ r) 2 }d (7.21)
And since the measurements from two systems are independent, the probability of
dissonance would be Psc = P1 x P2,.
Thus, for a given true state, the probability of dissonance
P(Dj y)= P x P 1  (7.22)
where P 1 and P are as stated above.
If the range and range rate estimate errors are correlated with some correlation
coefficient e (0 e 1), then
[ 2 i
2er U 2 e '2 2- 2 2
I'=[ 2 =Ts+ 2+2e-ro-a-72 (7.23)r c ,2 r2 r2 I~ o~2w a
P 2r 2 r(
we can still obtain the probability of dissonance through (7.22).
If we do not know the correlation coefficient or if system 1 is correlated with
system 2, given a true state, we can run a Monte Carlo Simulation to obtain the ratio of
the measured state being in dissonance space, which is the probability of dissonance for
the true state.
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In this example, the alerting system threshold parameters are given in Table 7.1,
which is similar to TCAS TA threshold parameter values set assuming two aircraft are at
an altitude of 20,000 ft (RTCA 1983)
Table 7.1
Alerting System Threshold Parameters
System 1 System 2
Threshold r = R r + r = R2function
Parameters R, = 7050ft R2=4650ft, r =25s
Thus, for example, the true state y = [r i]T = [7100ft - 97ft /s]' is in space
SIO (Figure 7.9). That is, system 1 will give an alert but system 2 will not alert. But with
the sensor error, when K=30ft, the probability of dissonance for this given true state is
0.2. Figure 7.9 also shows the probability of dissonance contours when K=30ft.
r + r- = R2
-
7000 7020 7040 7060
r=R1
+0
True state
0.0
7080 7100 7120
r (ft)
Figure 7.9 Probability of Dissonance for a True State (K=30ft)
Now, when the sensor accuracy becomes worse, that is, as the value of K
increases, the probability of dissonance for the given true state increases. For our
example, y = [71 00ft - 97ft /s] T , when K=1 00ft, the probability of dissonance for this
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true state is increased to 0.28 (Figure 7.10). The probability of dissonance contours also
change.
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0.1 True state
0.2
0.4 0.3 Q.
0..67 .-- 7 - - 04
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Figure 7.10 Probability of Dissonance for a True State (K=100ft)
Figure 7.11 shows how the probability of dissonance for this given true state
changes with a change in sensor accuracy.
0.3
2 0.25
a.1I
0
0.1
.
0.05
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
K(ft)
Figure 7.11 Effect of Sensor Accuracy on Probability of Dissonance for a True State
Probability of dissonance contours give system designer a complete picture of
probability of dissonance around the dissonance space, which helps the system designer
to decide new alert thresholds or control procedures to avoid or mitigate dissonance.
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If the relative costs of each alerting system's false alarms (Ci(FA)), missed
detections (Ci(MD)), and the relative cost of dissonance between two systems (CD) can be
quantified, then a multiple alerting cost function, J, can be defined that weights these
costs by the probability of each undesirable outcome,
J = P(D)C + PJ(FA)C,(FA)+ P(MD)C,(MD) (7.24)
i=O,1
Thus, the optimal alerting threshold can be set to minimize the cost of alerting.
As K goes to infinity, that is, the variance of the estimate error is very large, no
matter where the true state is, the probability of the measured state being in dissonance
space S,1 would be 0.25, since the whole state space has been separated into four
approximately equal-area subsets Soo, Sio, Soi, and S1I. Thus, as K goes to infinity, the
curve in Figure 7.11 should go to approximately 0.25.
Now, we want to check the effect of senor accuracy on the probability of
dissonance for a given complete true state trajectory. In this example, the given true state
trajectory starts from the initial stateyo = [7500ft - 90ft /s], with the acceleration
a = al - ao = 0 - (-1.22ft /s 2 ) = 1.22ft /s 2 (the own aircraft decelerates and the front
aircraft does not change its speed), and two systems have the same measurement update
rate 0.25s. The true state trajectory is shown moving from right to left in Figure 7.12,
where the probability of dissonance contours are based on K=30ft.
The cumulative probability of dissonance up to time t along the given trajectory is
given by
Pc (D I T(t)) = 1- fl (1 - P(D I y(t))) (7.25)t=O
As time goes to infinity, the cumulative probability of dissonance over the entire
trajectory is given by
P.(DI T) = limP(D I T(t)) (7.26)
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Figure 7.12 True state Trajectory with Measurement Update Rate 0.25s
Here, we assumed that the measurement error at each time is uncorrelated. The
following diagram (Figure 7.13) shows the probability of dissonance along the example
trajectory with K=30ft.
P(systemlalert I y(t))
P(dissonance| y(t))
P(system2alert I y(t))
P(dissonance T(t))
P, (dissonance I T)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
time(s)
Figure 7.13 Probability of Dissonance along Example Trajectory
10
As we can see from Figure 7.12, after four seconds from the initial state, the given
trajectory approaches the alerting systems' threshold boundary. The alert of system 1 is
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turned off as the trajectory is leaving alert space A1 to space A 10, so the probability of
system 1 alert given the measured state is decreasing from 1 to 0. Meanwhile, the alert of
system 2 is turning on, the trajectory is leaving space A20 to alert space A21, so the
probability of system 2 alert given the measured state is increasing from 0 to 1. Thus, the
probability of dissonance increases when the trajectory approaches the intersection point
of four subsets and decreases when the trajectory leaves the intersection point. Since the
given true trajectory almost crosses the intersection point of subsets (Figure 7.12), the
overall opportunity to trigger dissonance for this trajectory should be close to 0.5, that is
why P.(D I T) is close to 0.5.
Different trajectories will result in different shapes of curves in Figure 7.13. Even
for the same trajectory, if we choose a different initial start time, the measured state
would be different, which makes the probability of dissonance at each time different; and
if the update rate of measurements increases, the cumulative probability of dissonance
would change at each time since more measured states would be added. But the trend of
the curves would stay same.
Now, suppose the process starts from the same initial point as above, but we don't
know which trajectory will actually be followed. We assume one of three trajectories
with a = al -a =1.02ft /s 2 , a = a, -a = 1.22ft/s 2 ,or a = a, -a = 1.42ft/s 2
(Figure 7.14) must be followed. Each trajectory has the same opportunity to be chosen,
that is, P(T)=1/3.
r =R
-88 
7T
-90 r + -r. R
-92
-94
f-96
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Figure 7.14 Set of Uncertain True State Trajectories without Sensor Error
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As we can see from Figure 7.14, if there is no sensor error, only T would cross
the dissonance space, that is, I.(DII) =0, PJ(DI T2 )= 0, and P(D I T) = 1 -
But if we consider sensor accuracy, the measurement of each state on the
trajectories T and T2, which do not cross the dissonance space, would have the
probability to be in the dissonance space. Thus, the cumulative probability of dissonance
along these trajectories would no longer be zero. Figure 7.15 shows the case with
K=30ft, P. (D I TI) = 0.27 and P. (D I T2) = 0.48. It's also possible to have the
measurement of the states on the trajectory T3 be outside the dissonance space, so the
cumulative probability of dissonance along this trajectory would also change. In this
example, when K=30ft, P. (D I T3)= 0.68.
r=
r +.r =R2
(ft/s) 2...
-04-
r (ft)
Figure 7.15 Set of Uncertain True State Trajectories with K=30ft
As the sensor accuracy changes (the value of K changes), we can see how the
cumulative probability of dissonance along each trajectory changes (Figure 7.16). Figure
7.16 shows that when K increases, the cumulative probability of dissonance for those
trajectories not crossing the dissonance space (TI and T2) increases. For the trajectory
crossing the dissonance space (T3), the cumulative probability of dissonance decreases
first and then increases. This can be explained from the definition of the cumulative
probability of dissonance over the entire trajectory. Since
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P.(D I T) = limPI(D I T(t)) (7.27)
and
Pc (D I T(t)) = 1- n (- P(D I y(t))) (7.28)
t=O
if P(D I y(t)) is constant and 0 < P(D I y(t)) 1 for each true state y(t), then when t goes
to infinity, f7 (1- P(D I y(t))) must go to zero, which will make P.(D I T) go to one. As
t=O
we explained in Figure 7.11, when K goes to infinity, P(D I y(t)) goes to 0.25 (a constant
between 0 and 1) for any given true state y(t), so the cumulative probability of dissonance
P.(D I T) over any entire trajectory T goes to one when K goes to infinity. As we
mentioned for Figure 7.13, the cumulative probability of dissonance for each given K
value would be different if the measurement update rate were different, but the trends of
the curves in Figure 7.16 would be similar.
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Figure 7.16 Overall effect of Standard Deviation on P.(D I T)
Now, for this set of uncertain trajectories, given P(T,) =1 /3, we can get the
overall cumulative probability of dissonance and the effect of sensor accuracy on it
(Figure 7.17).
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Figure 7.17 contribution of Sensor Error to Dissonance
Recall that we assumed that each trajectory is equally likely to be chosen, and we
considered three trajectories, and only one of them crosses the dissonance space. When
there is no sensor error, K=O, P' (D) = 0.33, which is shown as a horizontal reference
line in Figure 7.17. The contribution of logic difference to the overall cumulative
probability of dissonance is therefore 1/3. As we can see from Figure 7.17, for most
values of K, sensor error induces dissonance, and the larger the values of K, the more the
dissonance is induced. But for some value of K (less than approximately 17ft), the
overall cumulative probability of dissonance decreases compared to the base line (the
case without the sensor error).
As we defined in chapter four, the probability of False Dissonance and Missed
Dissonance in this example are
1 1
PFD P(DI T) +- P.(DI T2) (7.29)3 3
and
PD =(1 - P(DI T3)) (7.30)3
When K=IOft, the probability of False Dissonance is less than the probability of Missed
dissonance (Figure 7.18), which explains the apparent sensor error benefit on Figure 7.17.
112
1 -
0.9-
0.8 P.(D)= P(D)+ PFD - PMD
0.7 1 1 DT)+P(I
.6 PFD. P'(D
3 0
0.4 - 3 '
0.3
0.2 1PMD ( (D T3))
0.1 3
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
K(ft)
Figure 7.18 Sensor error Benefit of Dissonance
Although for some value of K (less than approximately 17ft in this example), the
overall cumulative probability of dissonance decreases compared to the baseline (the case
without the sensor error), it may not be a good thing. As we can see from Figure 7.18,
decreased overall cumulative probability of dissonance means the increased probability
of missed dissonance, which also means that one of the alerting systems may have a
missed detection of the hazard. The hazard may then not be able to be avoided because
of this missed detection.
7.3 Consequences of Dissonance
The dangerous dissonance space is identified for the In-Trail example in this
section, which is part of the dissonance space S1 with opposite commands.
7.3.1 Hybrid Model of the Process
In this example, we will not consider any uncertainty. We assume that the human
operator would respond to the alerting system command without any delay on each alert
space boundary. That is, Aq = 0 for each q e Q ={1,..., N}.
Given alerting system 1 in this example, the whole state space U can be
separated into two subsets A10 and A,1 (Figure 7.2), that is, U = A10 u A1 and
A10 r A,1 = 0. In state space A10 , the continuous dynamics of the process are given by
the vector field Flo : Alo -+ R 2 . As we explained in Section 7.1, in state space A10 , the
operator is conceivably allowed to apply any acceleration he or she may desire within
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that acceleration limit. To simplify the study case, we assume the operator would not
change the velocity if there were no alerting system command. So, in state space Ao, the
process dynamics is governed by the differential equation (7.11) with To = 0, both
aircraft move with constant velocities. That is, the trajectory is given by equations (7.13)
and (7.14) with a = a, - ao = 0 . In state space A, , the continuous dynamics of the
process is given by vector field F,1 . The alerting system commands the pilot of the
trailing aircraft to accelerate with ao > amin, and the trajectory is given by equations
(7.13) and (7.14) with a=ai-aoe[-ama - amin ] (the trailing aircraft accelerates and
the front aircraft does not change speed).
Similar to alerting system 1, the whole state space U can be separated into two
subsets A2 0 and A21 given alerting system 2. In state space A20 , the vector field is F20 ,
we assume the trajectory is given by equations (7.13) and (7.14) with a = a, - ao = 0. In
state space A2 1, the vector field is F2 . Alerting system 2 commands the pilot of the
trailing aircraft to decelerate with ao -amin , the trajectory is given by equations (7.13)
and (7.14) with a = a, - ao e [amin am ] (the trailing aircraft decelerates and the front
aircraft remains at the initial speed).
With two alerting systems working together, the whole state space U can be
separated into four subsets Soo = Alo r A20 - Aol = rAo (- 21, SIO =A, r A20, and
S1 =Alln 0A 2 1. The governing vector field and acceptable acceleration range on each
subset is listed in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2
Governing Vector Field and Possible Acceleration on Four Subsets
Subset Governing Possible
vector field acceleration
x e SOO f e Foo a=0
x e Sl0  fe Fo aE- - am. - amin
x eSOI fe F, a E [amin a.
x C= S f eF,, a E - ama ama
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When x e S, , as we analyzed in Section 7.1.1, there is dissonance since the two
systems are issuing contradictory resolution commands (one to accelerate, the other to
decelerate), and the vector field is not well defined. We assume the aircraft would apply
any acceleration or deceleration within the performance limits in this dissonance space.
That is, the trajectory is given by equations (7.13) and (7.14) with
a = ai - ao e [- a am .
In this example, alerting system 1 is monitoring the efficient operation of the
process, so the larger the range between two aircraft, the more inefficient the operation of
the process. Alerting system 2 is monitoring the hazard space, where two aircraft will
crash when r = 0 . Since the part with negative range rate and r = 0 is not reachable, we
define the hazard space of this example as
H2 ={(r,r)Ir = O,i < 0} (7.31)
And we assumed that the designed threshold functions and required least deceleration
- amin of alerting system 2 could avoid the hazard space. The dissonance space is given
by equation (7.10).
Thus, the hybrid model of this process consists of a state space U = U Uq, where
qe=Q
q E Q {1,..., N}. Q could be an infinite set if two aircraft will not crash and the process
dynamics carry on. The state (q, x) of the process may flow within q only if the
continuous state is within any of the following sets, SOO = Ao r) A20 , Sol = Ao r) A21 ,
Si0 = A, r A 20 , and SH = A 1 r- A2 . The dynamics of the process within each subset do
not change unless the state reaches the boundaries of these subsets. That is, the
acceleration a does not change within each subset once it is chosen.
Figure 7.19 shows an example of the dynamics of the process. When the
continuous state hits the boundary of Slo, a discrete transition is forced; the continuous
dynamics within S 0 in the following discrete state q' is decided by the transition
function, which functions as a random processor to choose an acceleration a from
I- ama - amin ] based on some assumed probabilistic distribution function of a. Thus,
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the trajectory is given by equations (7.13) and (7.14) with a e [- ama - amin ], and a
does not change within SI0 once it is chosen. When the continuous state hits the
boundary of S, , the activated transition function chooses an acceleration a from
[- am am.]; the trajectory is given by equations (7.13) and (7.14) with
ae [- am. a.]. When the continuous state hits the boundary of Sol, the activated
transition function chooses an acceleration a from [amin ama]; the trajectory is given
by equations (7.13) and (7.14) with a e [amm ama. Finally, when the continuous state
hits the boundary of Soo, the activated transition function sets the acceleration a to be
zero; the trajectory is given by equations (7.13) and (7.14) with a = 0.
Soo
a = a -ao =0
Figure 7.19 Dynamics of the In-Trail Process
Figure 7.20 shows three example dynamics of this In-Trail process with threshold
parameters of two alerting systems given in Table 7.3. The trajectory with a solid line in
Figure 7.20 shows a case (case 1) where the aircraft crashes. Case 1 starts with initial
state (4000ft, 150ft/s), the transition function chooses a = -1.52ft /s 2 within
[- amax - am ] = [- 3.0 -1.5]ft /s 2 when the continuous state hits the boundary of
S10; when the continuous state hits the boundary of S,, the transition function chooses
a = -1.82ft /s 2 ; and when entering Sol, although the transition function chooses
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a = 1.52ft /s 2 E[amin ama]= [1.5 3.0]ft Is2 , it's too late to avoid the hazard space,
and the two aircraft crash. Case 2 (dashed trajectory in Figure 7.20) starts with the same
initial state as in case 1, but the transition function chooses a = -1.82ft / s2 when the
continuous state hits the boundary of S1,; when the continuous state hits the boundary of
S 11 , the transition function chooses a = 0 (i.e., the pilot does nothing when he or she gets
confused); and when entering S0 1, the transition function chooses a = 1.82ft / s 2 , which
leads the process out of the space Sol, and settle in space Soo with a = 0. Case 3 (dotted
trajectory in Figure 7.20) starts with a different initial state (4000ft, 80ft/s), which makes
the whole trajectory stay outside the dissonance space S11. In this case, the transition
function chooses a = -1.52ft/s 2 in S1 0 , a = 1.52ft /s 2 in SI0 , and a = 0 otherwise.
(4000, 150ftfs)
(4000, 80f .s)
_ _ N2
0 2000 4000 6000 6000 10000 12000 14000 16000
r(ft)
Figure 7.20 Example Process Dynamics
Table 7.3
Threshold Parameters for the Example Process Dynamics
System 1 System 2
Threshold r = R, r +r z- = R 2function
ri =H
Parameters R, = 7050ft R2 = 4650fi, -r = 25s
H = 102631ft2 /s
117
400
300
200
100
r
(ftls)
-100
-200
-300
-400
.00-
7.3.2 Identification of the Dangerous Dissonance Space
Given the hazard space H2 = {(r, ) Ir = 0 & i < 0} monitored by alerting system
2, we can use the backward reachability analysis to identify the dangerous dissonance
space in the dissonance space S I.
As we can see from Figure 7.21, if the trajectory with a = amin can reach the
hazard space H2 = {(r, ) Ir = 0 & i < 0}, then there must be trajectories with some
a e [amin amax] that could also reach the hazard space. So, in state space Sol, using
equations (7.13) and (7.14) with a = amin and destination state r(t) = 0 and (t) = 0
0= r~4  1 2 (.2
S= rA +rAt + -amint (7.32)
2
0 = iA + amint (7.33)
We can identify point A (Figure 7.21) on the boundary of alerting system 1
{(r, ) I r = R,}. Solving equations (7.31) and (7.32) with rA = RI, we can get
'A= - 2 amin R,. From any point below A on the boundary of alerting system 1
{(r, ) Ir = RI, - 2aminRi }, it is possible to reach the hazard space following the
trajectory given by equations (7.13) and (7.14) with a e [amin ama ] in state space Sol.
500
400
300
200
100
t
WVl)
-100B
.400
0 2000 40 8000 10000 12000 14000
r)
Figure 7.21 Dangerous Dissonance Space
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Now, with points {(r, ) Ir = R1, i - 2aminR, } as the target states, with system
dynamics given by equations (7.13) and (7.14) with a e [- amax am], we want to
identify those initial states on the boundary of alerting system 2 {(r, i)I r-R2 = J}. As
- r
we can see from Figure 7.21, we only need to identify point B, since if the trajectory with
a = -am can reach point A from point B, then any state below B on {(r, ) r - 2 =
m-ar
could reach points {(r, ) |r = R1,i : - 2aminR, } following the trajectories given by
equations (7.13) and (7.14) with some a e [- amax amax].
In state space S11, solving equations (7.13) and (7.14) with a = -ax and
destination state r(t) = R and i(t) = - 2aminR (state A)
R = rB+*Bt-Iamat2  (7.34)
2
-2amin R, = B amaxt (7.35)
and an additional condition
rB-R 2  _r (7.36)
- rB
We can identify point B with
rB = max T- 2(amin + amax)Ri - 2 amaxR 2 + amax2 2 (7.37)
and equation (7.35). So the dangerous dissonance space boundary is the set
{(r, -) .2 = r & i : amaxr - 2(amin + amax)Ri -2amaxR 2 + amax22 } (7.38)
-r
As shown in Figure 7.22, the dangerous dissonance space is the space below the curve
AB in the dissonance space S I. Entering S1 above the curve will be safe as long as
a e [-am,. amax
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7.4 Ways to Mitigate Dissonance
In this section, several ways to mitigate dissonance (especially, the dangerous
dissonance) are presented based on the trade off between efficiency and the risk of
hazard.
7.4.1 Prioritization
In this example, System 1 has been designed to monitor the efficient operation of
the process, while System 2 is for a collision hazard. Since a hazard alert is highly
critical, it needs immediate attention of the flight crew, so it could be logical to put
System 2 in higher priority. That is, we can prioritize System 2 with a higher priority
than system 1 (or inhibit system 1) whenever both systems would otherwise be triggered.
Thus, the process can only go from Sio to Soi, which is not likely to be dissonant because
of the similar trend in the action spaces of each system (recall Figure 7.6). This
prioritization is shown in Figure 7.22 as a change in the threshold function of alerting
system 1.
r
Figure 7.22 Avoid Dissonance through Prioritizing System 2
7.4.2 Modify System Design
The potential for dissonance could be reduced by modifying one or both systems'
decision thresholds to reduce the size of S 1
r -R 2As shown in Figure 7.23, we can modify the threshold function r- = T to
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r-2 
=R
- r
r = RI
when
when
R2  ; r < R
r > RI
(7.39)
which eliminates the dissonance space. But it may not be a proper way. With the new
threshold function, when the closure rate is large, the alert from system 2 may be too late
for the pilot to avoid the hazard.
Change threshold
function of system 2
r
- - r~. -
Change threshold
function of system 1
t
I -
r
Figure 7.23 Modify System Design to Reduce the Potential for Dissonance
We assume the range between two aircraft is the only observable information to
system 1, so the only way to change the threshold function of system 1 is to change R1.
As we can see from Figure 7.23, increasing R1 can reduce the size of dissonance space,
but that may not satisfy the efficient operation requirement, as aircraft may operate too
far apart from one another.
To be able to optimize both system designs to minimize the dissonance space and
maximize operation efficiency with restriction for the safety requirement, we need to
solve a specific multi-objective optimization problem, depending on which parameters
can be changed and the definition of the efficient operation. Also, the safety requirement
will be related to the choice of resolution maneuvers.
For example, assume that efficient operation is measured by the distance between
two aircraft, and, in any case, the distance between two aircraft is not allowed to be
bigger than some value Rmax- Also assume that the safety requirement is that the two
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6
aircraft will not crash if the trailing aircraft decelerates with ao = -a. when the range
rate between two aircraft reaches some maximum value - f... Given the minimum safe
separation between two aircraft R2, we want to optimize R1 and r to minimize the
dissonance space to satisfy the efficient operation and safety requirement. Thus, the
multi-objective optimization problem has been simplified as a single objective
optimization problem with the performance requirements of safety and efficient operation
as constraints.
To satisfy the efficient operation requirement, we need to identify the constraint
related to efficient operation. Suppose the highest possible closure rate between two
aircraft is given as *... With state (R.,0) as the target state, solving the equations
(7.13) and (7.14) with a = -ain and initial state (Ri,*ma),
Rmax= Ri + imat -I amint 2  (7.40)
2
0 = *ma - amint (7.41)
the constraints satisfying efficient operation can be given as
2
Ri ! Rma - "a (7.42)
2amin
To satisfy the safety requirement, starting from the point with highest closure rate
- max on r-R 2 - - (R2 + mar,-*m),the trajectory given by the equations (7.13) and
- r
(7.14) with a = am should not be able to reach the target state (0,0). That is, solving
0 = R 2 + maxr - t + -amt
2  (7.43)
2
0 = -m +amt (7.44)
i 2 -2R2a
we get z- = a 2 "max So, the constraint satisfying safety can be given as2 ama rm
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m 2 - 2 R a
r ".X 2 "ax (7.45)2amax 'max
Given the maximum range rate (250ft/s) the process could have, the area of the
dissonance space is shown in Figure 7.24.
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Figure 7.24 The Area of Dissonance Space
This simplified single objective optimization problem can be stated as follows,
min f(R 1,r)= S = ( 2 RI +i ) 2  (7.46)R1,r 2
Subject to
2
R, :! R. - m"xRRmax 2ax
amin
2a
Smax 2 - 2R am
2a~ max
The first-order necessary conditions, in addition to the constraints, are,
1 R2 - R (23+ p = 0
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(7.42)
(7.45)
(7.47)
(2 2
+ . M Jrmx-)[im2 x2
1
-- (R 2 -R)vr2
p/i 0
p2 0
S2
p1 (RI - Rmax + rmax )=02
amin
2
P2( rma, -2R 2am" ) 02 amax'max
Intuitively, larger RI and smaller z may result in smaller f(RI, r) . Thus, assuming both
constraints are inactive (p, = 0 & P2 = 0 ), the problem has the solution
2
=rma -
2 R2 am
2amx 'max
2
R = Rmax _ 'x. Since pA = P2 = 0, we conclude that this
2
amin
solution satisfies the first-order necessary conditions.
Figure 7.25 compares the threshold functions using optimal parameters R and v
(solid lines) to the original designed threshold functions (dashed lines), given
R2 = 4650ft, amax = 3.Oft /s 2 , amin=1.5ft/s2, Rma = 29000ft, and imax = 250ft/s.
(fts)
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Figure 7.25 Optimal Threshold Functions
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2
F- 2 =0 (7.48)
(7.49)
(7.50)
(7.51)
(7.52)
00
Table 7.4 shows the value of the original thresholds and the optimal thresholds.
Table 7.4
The Optimal Thresholds
original optimal
R, 7050 ft 8167 ft
T 25s 23s
We also want to check the safety benefit of the optimal threshold function.
Assuming that the initial range rate is uniformly distributed between 0 and
max = 250ft /s, we want to compare the ratio of initial range rate that could lead the
process to the dangerous dissonance space between the original designed threshold
functions and the optimal ones. With point B (upper point of the dangerous dissonance
space boundary) in Figure 7.21 as the target state, equation (7.13) and (7.14) can be used
to identified the initial range rate on r = R, , with which the process could reach point B
with a = amax = 3.Oft /s 2 . That is, solving
r=1R, + Ot - amaxt2 (7.53)
2
B = i0 - amaxt (7.54)
we can get
= + 2a (r, - R,) (7.55)
where
rB = R2 -ama r 2 - 2amin Ri - 2 amaxR 2 + amax 2  (7.56)
'B = amaxT - V2aminR, - 2 amax R 2 + amax, 2 (7.57)
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Thus, with the original design of threshold functions (RI = 7050ftr = 25s),
rB = 7848ft, rB = -128ft /s, then *O = 145ft /s . That is, with any initial range rate
bigger than 145ft / s (42% of the possible initial states), the process could reach the
dangerous dissonance space with the original design of threshold functions. But with the
optimal design (R1 =8167ft, r = 23s), rB =8232ft, B = -155ft /s, then io =156ft / s.
That is, unless the initial range rate is bigger than 156ft /s (37% of the possible initial
states), the process would not reach the dangerous dissonance space with the optimal
design of threshold functions. Since the aircraft could crash when entering the dangerous
dissonance space, we could say the safety is improved by 5% (from a risk of 42% to
37%) with the optimal design of threshold functions.
If both range and range rate are observable for system 1, then the system design
can be modified more flexibly. For example, we can change the shape of the threshold
function of s ystem 1 to eliminate the dissonance space and command the aircraft 0 to
accelerate according to the range rate between two aircraft (Figure 7.26). When the range
rate is positive (the front aircraft is moving faster than the rare aircraft), the larger the
range rate, the larger the acceleration that the system 1 should command. Thus if the
threshold function of system 1 can reflect this relation (the curve in the positive range
rate region shown in Figure 7.26), then the system 1 can be designed to have a unique
acceleration command. Also shown in Figure 7.26, the threshold function in the negative
range rate region of system 1 is designed to have a gap with the threshold function of
system 2, which can avoid the possible dynamic dissonance caused by command
changing from accelerating to decelerating in very short time period.
Figure 7.26 Change the Shape of Threshold Function to Avoid Dissonance
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7.4.3 Modify Control Strategy
As we can see from section 7.4.2, the whole dissonance space is hard to eliminate
through modifying system design alone, to satisfy safety and efficient operation
requirements at the same time. To avoid the unsafe consequences of dissonance, we can
modify the required control of the trailing aircraft in the alert space of system 1 to prevent
the two vehicles from entering the dangerous dissonance space in S, 1; or we can identify
the required control of the trailing aircraft in dangerous dissonance space to prevent the
hazard (collision of two aircraft).
Given an initial condition, we can identify the acceleration requirement for the
trailing aircraft in the alert space of system 1 to avoid entering the dangerous dissonance
space in S1. With point B in Figure 7.21 as the target state, equations (7.13) and (7.14)
can be used to identify the relation between initial range rate on r = R, and the required
acceleration of trailing aircraft in alert space of system 1 to prevent the two vehicles from
entering the dangerous dissonance space in S, 1. That is, solving
R 2 -a,.r -2 _ 2 ainRi - 2 amaxR 2 +am 2 2 = R1 +rOt - I at 2 (7.58)2
amax z - 2amin R, - 2 amaxJR2 + a 22 = O -at (7.59)
we can get the relationship between a and io
a = 0 B
a rB-Jil (7.60)2(rB - RI)
where
rB = R2 -ama2 -r2 2ain R1 - 2 amaR 2 +am r2 (7.61)
'B = amaxr - V 2 amin R, - 2 ama, R2 + amax 2V 2 (7.62)
That is, given an initial state (R1 , O), to prevent the two vehicles from entering the
dangerous dissonance space in S 1, the acceleration of the trailing aircraft ao in state
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.2 -2
space S10 must be larger than rB -r since a = a, - ao = -ao. But when '0 > 'B
2(rB - R,)
.2 -2
is negative. That is, if the initial range rate is bigger than rB, it is impossible2 (rB - RI)
(with a e [- ama a.]) to prevent the two vehicles from entering the dangerous
dissonance space in S,1 . Thus, the initial condition must be restricted to avoid entering
the dangerous dissonance space. Also, as we identified in Section 7.4.2, with any initial
range rate *0 < VB2 + 2ama (rB - R,) on r = Rl, it is not possible (with
a e [- am. a.]) to enter the dangerous dissonance space, so the process is safe.
Figure 7.27 shows the required acceleration in Sio given the initial range rate
between r + 2 am. (rB - R1) and iB on r = R, to avoid entering the dangerous
dissonance space.
Impossible to avoid
(RIiB) erous dissonance space
i2 _ 2g
ao > 0'B
-
2(rB- RI)
(R -*j+ 2ama(rB - R1 ))
r
Impossible enter
dangerous dissonance space
2 B
A
Figure 7.27 Required Acceleration to
Avoid Entering Dangerous Dissonance Space
Once in dangerous dissonance space, we can restrict the deceleration of the
trailing aircraft to avoid the hazard. Since we assumed that the required deceleration
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command - amin and the threshold function -2 = r of alerting system 2 has been
designed to be able to avoid the hazard, then the hazard should be able to be avoided as
long as the trailing aircraft decelerates with ao -amm once in dangerous dissonance
space.
7.4.4 Modify Operational Procedures
From the beginning of this example, we assumed that the acceleration of the
process a is constant in each subset Smn as long as it has been chosen. To avoid
dissonance, we can change the operational procedure. That is, we can command the
trailing aircraft to accelerate until some range rate i* in S10, and then keep that range rate
to avoid entering the dissonance space. This procedure is shown in Figure 7.28.
a E [- a. amn
a= 
]
r
a=O
B
H2 A
Figure 7.28 Change Operational Procedure to Avoid Dissonance
As we can see from Figure 7.28, as long as the range rate i* is larger than the
range rate of the intersection point P of two alerting systems boundaries, which is
-R, (negative), the process would always be able to avoid entering the dissonance
space.
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7.4.5 Training
Without inhibiting the alert of system 1, we can train the pilot to always follow
the maneuver according to command of system 2 once in dissonance space. This would
make sense to the pilot since the pilot would understand that the alert for safety is more
critical than an alert for efficiency.
The trailing pilot can be trained to take the maneuver we identified in Section
7.4.3 in SO to prevent the two vehicles from entering the dangerous dissonance space, or
once in dangerous dissonance space to avoid the hazard.
7.5 Summary
This chapter has demonstrated the framework of dissonance modeling and
analysis we developed in previous chapters using a conceptual In-Trail example.
Through formally describing the alerting systems logic, the conditions for the
possible perceived dissonance have been identified mathematically and graphically. The
dissonance space with conflict resolution command was identified to be problematic and
has been analyzed.
With a simple sensor error model, several example analyses have been performed:
the probability of dissonance for a given true state, the cumulative probability of
dissonance over the given trajectory, and the overall cumulative probability of dissonance
for a set of uncertain trajectories. The changes of these probabilities as the sensor error
distribution change were also analyzed. Finally, the contribution of sensor error to
dissonance was identified.
A hybrid model was built to analyze the hybrid phenomenon of the process in this
example. The dangerous dissonance space was identified through backward reachability
analysis.
Mitigation methods suggested in chapter 6 were demonstrated in this example to
prevent the dissonance or reduce the effect of dissonance based on the trade off between
efficiency and the risk of hazard. The following table (Table 7.5) gives a summary of all
these methods, including the advantages and disadvantages for each of them.
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Table 7.5
Comparison of Mitigation Methods
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Mitigation Related diagram Advantages Disadvantages
The operation
Prioritization Simple and may not
pefficiency requirementeasy to be impleented in some area
Hard to find
optimal sokutionAvoid dissonance
from ro for most multi-objective
system design -ine oo optimization problem
Modify Guarantee to be safe Required maneuver
control strategy r and efficient operation may be hard to
implement
r
Modify Guarantee to be safe Lose some
operational pr and efficient operation operation space
procedure
Training No additional requirement May fall short
for system design in high stress case
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8. Example Application: Air Traffic Separation
One area where dissonance is becoming an identified issue involves airborne
alerting systems for traffic management safety. Several different traffic alerting system
concepts are in use or under development, and they must be carefully matched to prevent
dissonance. Time-critical collision alerting is the function of an Airborne Collision
Avoidance System (ACAS), and more strategic maintenance of separation between
aircraft is the function of a different Airborne Separation Assurance System (ASAS).
Each type of system has distinct requirements due to different timescales, consequences,
and information quality with which to base decisions. Combining ASAS and ACAS
components within a single aircraft and between different aircraft will be a challenging
problem to overcome to ensure that these systems convey consistent information to
decision-makers.
One form of ACAS already in operation is the Traffic Alert and Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS), which has been mandated on U. S. transport aircraft since
the early 1990s (RTCA, 1983). TCAS uses range, range rate, altitude, and altitude rate
between two aircraft via transponder messages. The quality of this information limits the
ability to make accurate collision predictions beyond approximately 45 seconds. Based
on this information, TCAS has two alerting functions: Traffic Advisories (TA), which
direct the crew's attention to a potential threat, and Resolution Advisories (RA), which
provide vertical collision avoidance commands to the crew. As mentioned earlier,
climb/descend dissonance has already been noted between TCAS and air traffic
controller instructions in actual operations. Dissonance between two different automation
systems may exacerbate this type of human factors dilemma.
Recently, an ASAS concept termed Airborne Conflict Management (ACM) is
being developed, and initial concepts and specifications have been drafted by an RTCA
subcommittee (Kelly, 1999; RTCA, 2000). ACM uses an Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data link to enable longer look-ahead than is possible
with TCAS. ADS-B periodically broadcasts aircraft information such as identification,
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horizontal position, velocity, altitude, and the next trajectory change point. This
information may enable accurate prediction of traffic conflicts on timescales on the order
of minutes. In the initial concept, ACM includes three alert levels built around two
separation zones called the Protected Airspace Zone (PAZ), and a smaller Collision
Avoidance Zone (CAZ). A Low Level Alert is issued well before the violation of the
PAZ with the intent to allow the crew time to resolve the conflict efficiently. If
implemented and used properly, Low Level Alerts should be the only alerts issued from
ACM. However, if the conflict remains unresolved, a PAZ Alert will be issued. A
maneuvering response should then be initiated with a minimum of delay. If the conflict is
still not resolved, a CAZ Alert is ultimately issued when immediate action is required to
avoid a near-miss.
Several issues relate to the interoperability between TCAS and ACM. One set of
issues relates to cases where TCAS and ACM are both installed on the same aircraft.
TCAS measures relative range and bearing, while ACM receives the broadcast state
vector and intent. The different surveillance sources may result in two targets that need to
be merged or fused on displays (Abeloos, 2000). The different surveillance methods
used by TCAS and ACM may also produce different threat projections between the same
targets. While ACM PAZ alerts will protect a much larger minimum separation than
TCAS, the enhanced accuracy of ADS-B may allow ACM to determine that no threat
exists while TCAS still predicts a threat (in some geometries). As such, TCAS may issue
alerts when ACM sees no conflict at all. This may cause a problem if pilots have become
accustomed to receiving ACM alerts prior to TCAS alerts. An additional source of
concern would be transitioning from a lateral maneuver, which might be preferable
during the resolution of a PAZ alert, to a vertical maneuver commanded by TCAS. The
ability of pilots to make this transition or the degree to which they may continue the
lateral maneuver needs to be studied. Finally, it would be preferable to not experience
TCAS alerts at all if an ACM advisory is being followed. It is unlikely, however, due to
certification requirements, that TCAS thresholds could be modified to reduce this type of
dissonance. So, adjustments may need to be made to ACM instead.
A second group of issues relates to cases where TCAS is installed on one aircraft
but ACM is installed on another. In this case, both aircraft can detect each other, but the
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two systems may issue different resolution advisories at different times. A problem exists
if these resolutions are not coordinated or compatible.
Finally, a third group of issues revolves around the integration of both ACM and
TCAS with yet other automated traffic alerting systems. Examples include existing or
proposed ground-based conflict detection and resolution systems or specialized collision
alerting systems for closely-spaced parallel approach (Isaacson, 1997; Brudnicki, 1997;
Samanant, 2000). Ensuring that these systems all operate harmoniously is going to be an
increasingly challenging problem given these systems' complexity.
In this chapter, we apply the framework of dissonance developed in previous
chapters to model and analyze the possible dissonance between TCAS and ACM,
including perceived dissonance due to process dynamics. We are then interested to
mathematically identify the conditions for dissonance between the two systems, and
suggest methods to avoid or mitigate the dissonance.
8.1 Identification of Conditions for Dissonance
8.1.1 Aircraft Encounter Kinematics
To simplify the case study, the analysis of TCAS and ACM is limited here to only
horizontal-plane motion where the two aircraft are coaltitude and converging. Similar
analysis could be done for three dimensional cases.
Several kinematics parameters arerequired for the mathematical description of
TCAS and ACM later. Figure 8.1 shows two aircraft (0 and 1) in the horizontal plane
using Cartesian coordinates oriented along and perpendicular to aircraft O's velocity
vector. This choice of frame is arbitrary but simplifies the kinematics equations
somewhat. The aircraft are a distance x and y apart in this frame, and have velocity
vectors vo = [vox, voy]T with voy=O and vi = [vIx, viy]T. The relative position of the aircraft
can also be expressed in terms of their range r and bearing X:
r=x2 +2 (8.1)
z= tan -(y/x) (8.2)
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Figure 8.1 Horizontal Plane Kinematics
The relative velocity between aircraft is
V, = (v1 , - v 0 )2 +v1 (8.3)
which can be expressed in terms of the range rate
r = -V, cos 0 (8.4)
where
6 = x---#(8.5)
and
#= tan-ltvi' (8.6)
Finally, the distance until the closest point of approach, a, and the miss distance,
bare given by:
a = r cos 0 (8.7)
b = r sin 0 (8.8)
8.1.2 Formal Description of TCAS and ACM
In the case of TCAS and ACM, the complete state vector x represents the three-
dimensional position and velocity vectors of each aircraft involved. As mentioned above,
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we will focus on the horizontal plane motion of two aircraft, though the examples can be
extended to three dimensions.
Consider a situation in which both ACM and TCAS are implemented on aircraft 0
in Figure 8.1. The complete state vector is not available to the alerting system logic, but
is observed through a set of sensors. The resulting information that is observable to each
alerting system is included in the vector y. For TCAS (system 1), y is a vector including
the range and range rate between two aircraft (again, considering the horizontal plane
only):
Y i = [r,r]T
[ x2+y2,-V,.cosV (8.9)
= G (x)
In contrast, ACM (system 2) uses the basic state vector components:
Y2 =[x, y, vox, vix, viy]T = G2 (x) (8.10)
So, ACM is able to observe the complete kinematics relationship in Figure 8.1.
TCAS only has access to range and range rate, which significantly limits the degree to
which it can predict the evolution of the encounter between aircraft.
TCAS has three system alert stages:
Stage 0 = No threat. Traffic is shown on a map display using a white diamond
symbol that also indicates its altitude and whether it is climbing or descending. No
additional information is provided. ai = 0.
Stage 1 = Traffic Advisory (TA). A Master Caution light is illuminated in amber,
the traffic icon changes to a yellow circle on the traffic display, and an aural "Traffic,
Traffic" alert is issued in the cockpit. a, = 1.
Stage 2 = Resolution Advisory (RA). A Master Warning light is illuminated in
red, the traffic icon changes to a red square on the traffic display, and an aural resolution
command is issued (such as "Climb! Climb!") and the required climb angle or climb rate
is shown on a cockpit display. al = 2.
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We will focus on the higher two ACM alert stages: the PAZ alert (a2= 1), and the
CAZ alert (a2= 2). It should be remembered, however, that the TCAS alert stages carry
different meanings than the ACM stages. For example, ai = 2 means that an RA is issued
from TCAS, while a2= 2 means that a CAZ alert is issued from ACM. The actions the
pilot should take in each case may be significantly different. The symbolic notation,
though, provides a means for articulating the different alert stages within each system.
The vector z combines all the information that is displayed to the human operator
by the alerting system. For TCAS and ACM, the information in z includes a traffic
display in the cockpit, aural messages, lights, and any resolution command and guidance
information.
The converging, horizontal-plane TCAS thresholds are based on four parameters:
DMOD, DMODTA, -r, and r.TA At its core, the RA threshold can be defined as (RTCA,
1983):
r < (DMOD - z) < RA Alert (8.11)
if an RA is not issued, a TA occurs when the following is satisfied:
r 2 < DMODTA 2 -rrTA < TA Alert (8.12)
Even though TCAS operates with only r and i as states, its thresholds can be rewritten in
terms of the more general state parameters from figure 8.1. From Equation 8.12, the TA
threshold then lies in state space according to the following equation:
a 2 +b 2 < DMODTA2 +VrTAa (8.13)
Or equivalently,
(a- ) 2 +b 2 <DMODTA +( r )2 (8.14)
2 2
So, aligned in a new (a, b) Cartesian coordinate frame in figure 8.1 (along and
perpendicular to the relative velocity vector), the TA threshold is a circle centered on
V~ri ,0) with radius DMODTA2 +(Vr ) 2
2 2
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In a similar manner and coordinate system, the criterion for an RA (Equation
8.11) can be rewritten as:
(a - 2.+b 2 < DMOD ja +b2 +(7r')2 (8.15)2 2
The alert stage sets for TCAS are then formally defined by the threshold function
T1 using predicates:
fl V :(a - )2 +bV2 < VDMODTA2 +V 2
f 1 :(2- 2
112 :(a _) +b2 < DMOD a2 + b 2
T= 2 2 (8.16)
A10 = Af 12
Al1 = f 1 nf 12
A12 = f 2
So, for example, if predicatefu is true butfi is false, then the state lies in the
region A I and a TA is issued.
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Figure 8.2 Example TCAS Threshold Function and Alert Stages
The formalized TCAS threshold function and alert stages can be visualized for a
given aircraft encounter situation. Figure 8.2 shows one example case for two aircraft
heading in opposite directions, each at 500 kt. The two alert threshold regions are then
shown to scale in the relative frame of one aircraft, with threshold parameter values set
assuming the encounter occurs at an altitude of 20,000 ft (RTCA 1983). A given type of
alert will occur if the intruder aircraft enters into the regions shown.
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The thresholds for ACM are based on four parameters, PAZ, CAZ, rpAz, and -rcAz
(RTCA 2000).
a- CAZ 2 -b 2
Vr < CAZ < CAZ Alert (8.17)
V,.
if there is no CAZ alert, then a PAZ alert is issued according to:
a- PAZ 2-b 2
V -2< rPAZ < PAZ Alert (8.18)
V.
With ACM, A20 corresponds to a no-alert or low level alert condition, A2 1
corresponds to a PAZ alert, and A 22 represents the space where a CAZ alert is issued.
These regions are formally defined by the threshold function T2:
a-PAZ2 -b 2f21<ZPAZ
Vr
a - CA 2 -b 2
T2V CAZ (8.19)
A20 f 2 1 n f 2 2
A2 1 f 21 r)f 2 2
A22  f22
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Figure 8.3 Example ACM Threshold Function and Alert Stages
With the same encounter situation shown in Figure 8.2, the formalized ACM
threshold function and alert stages can be visualized in Figure 8.3, with threshold
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parameter values set assuming the encounter occurs at an altitude of 20,000 ft (RTCA
2000).
Equations 8.16 and 8.19 then give a formal basis by which a given state can be
translated into an alert stage for each system. By then comparing combinations of alert
stages between the two systems, conditions leading to static or dynamic dissonance can
be identified.
8.1.3 Conditions for Dissonance
Having set up the basic alert stage regions in state space, we can analyze the two
systems together. There are nine possible combinations of alert spaces between TCAS
and ACM: Soo = Alo - A20 , Sol = Alo r A21 , S 02 =A 10  A22 , SIO =A 11 n A20
S11 =A,, r1 nA 21 , S 12 = A11 r A2 1, S20 = A12 n A 20 1 = A12 r A2 1 and
S22 = A12 r A22 -
A more convenient way of visualizing this region is to plot the four alert stages
for the two systems (TA, RA, PAZ, CAZ) for a given aircraft encounter situation. Figure
8.4 shows the same encounter situation and same threshold parameter values as we
showed in Figure 8.2 and 8.3.
10 RA TA
S22 Su120
5 CAZ
- 20
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Figure 8.4 Example TCAS and ACM Thresholds
ACM is designed to provide an earlier warning of traffic than TCAS. Should this
happen, there is probably no perceived dissonance from the pilot's point of view, even
though the alert stage from ACM is at a higher level than that from TCAS. So, alert
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spaces Soo, Sol, and S0 2 are not dissonance spaces. If the opposite occurred, however,
there may be perceived dissonance because the pilot may not understand why ACM does
not rate the traffic as a threat while TCAS does.
For example, a TCAS RA without any prior ACM alert conditions may be
perceived as dissonant if pilots become accustomed to ACM advisories occurring before
TCAS alerts. This condition is represented by the set S20 =A 12 r-) A20, or equivalently in
terms of predicates:
S20 = 12 r (f 2 r 2 (8.20)
In terms of the specific state values involved, and because the CAZ threshold is
always within the PAZ threshold, equation 8.20 can be rewritten as:
{(a- VT) 2 +b 2 < DMOD a 2 +b 2 +(V ) 2 { a- PAZ 2 -b 2 > Tz (8.21)
2 2 nt V,
As Figure 8.4 shows, the PAZ region extends well in front of the CAZ, TA, and
RA regions. This is intentional, to provide the pilots ample time to respond to a potential
conflict well before severe maneuvering is required. The CAZ is a significantly thinner
region, also extending farther forward than the TA or RA. In this situation, however, note
that the TA and RA thresholds do extend laterally beyond the CAZ and PAZ regions. If
an intruder were to enter the Sio or S20 regions, dissonance could be perceived if the pilot
was concerned why a PAZ alert did not accompany or precede the TCAS alert. Although
regions Sio and S20 appear to be relatively small in Figure 8.4, they do extend between 3
to 6 nmi laterally and cover an area over 16 nmi2.
One difficulty in visualizing alerting behavior is that the problem is complex and
multidimensional. A change in speed or heading, for example, would change the sizes
and orientations of all of the alerting regions in Figure 8.4. Still, such a diagram can be
useful for examining specific encounter situations.
8.1.4 Perceived Dissonance Due to Process Dynamics
In addition to examining the alerting regions to expose areas where alert stage
dissonance could be perceived, it is also necessary to examine the process dynamics to
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see how dissonance may evolve over time. One of the major issues with the integration
of ACM and TCAS is how to manage ACM alerts that are later upgraded to TCAS alerts.
If action is taken in response to an ACM alert, it is preferable that no TCAS alert occur
(RTCA 2000). Accordingly, one issue to examine is what types of ACM resolution
maneuvers are required to prevent TCAS alerts from occurring.
As a somewhat extreme example, consider a situation in which a CAZ alert is
issued against one aircraft directly in front of another and heading in the opposite
direction, with both aircraft at 500 kt. In response to the CAZ alert, assume that one
aircraft begins a turning maneuver with a certain response delay, a roll-in to a certain
bank angle, and a roll-out at a certain new heading angle.
Figure 8.5 shows four snapshots (spaced every 10 seconds) of the two aircraft and
the alert thresholds assuming one aircraft follows a turning avoidance action with a 10
second time delay, 100 bank angle, and 200 final heading change. Figure 8.5(a) shows the
situation immediately following the 10 seconds time delay. Approximately 10 seconds
later (Figure 8.5[b]), the CAZ region is exited but the aircraft crosses the boundary of the
TCAS TA region. Here, dissonance would be perceived since ACM is downgrading the
alert stage and TCAS is upgrading the alert stage. Within the next 10 seconds (Figure
8.5[c]), a TA is issued. Finally (Figure 8.5[d]), an RA is issued from TCAS, commanding
the pilot to climb or descend. So, in this extreme situation there is a progression from
taking action in response to an ACM alert that ultimately ends in a TCAS RA. The RA
command itself may also cause some confusion as the pilot must determine whether to
continue the turn that has already been initiated, or to execute the climb or descent
command.
The same thresholds in Figure 8.5 could also be placed on the second aircraft,
which might then also receive and react to alerts. In particular, it may be relatively
common for ACM to be installed on one aircraft while TCAS is installed on the other. In
that situation, the ACM aircraft would begin maneuvering in response to the PAZ or
CAZ alert. Unless that aircraft performed a sufficiently aggressive maneuver, a TCAS
TA or RA could still be issued on the second aircraft. If not designed properly, ACM
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might not able to prevent the second aircraft from having to maneuver in response to
TCAS.
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Figure 8.5 TCAS and ACM Thresholds During Avoidance Maneuver
8.2 Management of Dissonance
To address one aspect of the TCAS / ACM compatibility issue, a Conflict
Resolution System Priority Matrix has been developed (RTCA, 2000). This matrix
proposes suppressing any ACM advisories that are dissonant with TCAS RAs. The main
issue here is that the dissonant TCAS RA may occur after the ACM alert. ACM may
need to be designed with some means for predicting that a TCAS alert will be occurring,
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and ACM advisories may need to be modified to ensure that they remain in consonance
with that future TCAS alert.
An alternate way to mitigate the effect of alerting system conflicts is through
operator training. Pilots will be trained, for example, that ACM and TCAS use different
decision-making logic, and that alerts from the two systems may not (and in fact probably
will not) occur in concert. In extreme situations, however, training should not be relied
upon too greatly.
Additionally, it may be possible to modify air traffic operations themselves so that
dissonance is less likely. A request to pilots to reduce their vertical speed as the aircraft
nears a target altitude, for example, is one operational change that has already been made
to help reduce the likelihood of dissonance between TCAS false alarms and air traffic
controllers.
Finally, it may be necessary to modify the design of the logic in the new (or
existing) alerting system to reduce the potential for dissonance as much as possible. It
was suggested by the RTCA subcommittee, for instance, that ACM conflict resolution
advisories should allow the conflict to be resolved without triggering any TCAS
advisories (RTCA 2000). One means of trying to ensure this is to modify ACM-induced
maneuvers so that the likelihood of triggering a TCAS alert is small. That is, through
identifying the subset of F.n (F,.n - FnnD) for ACM resolution advisories as we
suggested in Chapter 6, the dynamic dissonance between TCAS and ACM could be
avoided. This issue is examined in more detail in the rest of the section.
Heading
Bank Angle 4--
Time Delay
Start Alert
Figure 8.6 ACM Maneuver Model
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To address this issue, a point-mass simulation was executed to examine the
interaction between aircraft trajectories and the alert stages of ACM and TCAS (Figure
8.6). To run the simulation, an intruder aircraft was placed directly in front of a host
aircraft, traveling in the opposite direction, with each aircraft at 500 kt. Upon crossing the
PAZ alert threshold, a given time delay was implemented, and then the host aircraft
performed a roll-in to a certain bank angle and rolled out at a given heading angle. Time
delay, bank angle, and heading change parameters were systematically varied. Depending
on the combination of response latency, bank angle, and turn angle, either (i) no TCAS
alert would be issued, (ii) a TA would be issued during the maneuver, or (iii) both a TA
and RA would be issued.
Figure 8.7 shows the interactions between delay, bank angle, turn heading, and
TCAS alert status. The curves that are shown represent boundaries between different
TCAS alert behaviors. Two groups of curves are shown. The solid lines represent the
boundary between RA and TA (lower solid line) or between TA and no alert (upper solid
line) when there is no time delay following the PAZ alert. The dashed lines show similar
boundaries when there is a 10 second response delay after the PAZ alert. A combination
of bank angle and turn angle toward the lower-left of the plot will result in an RA.
Performing a maneuver between sets of curves will result in a TA. Making a large
enough turn with a large enough bank angle (upper-right part of the diagram) will avoid
any TCAS alert from occurring.
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Figure 8.7 Effect of PAZ Avoidance Maneuver
on TCAS Alert Status (500 kt opposite direction)
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For example, shown in Figure 8.7, with no time delay and a 15 degree bank angle,
the host aircraft must turn beyond 20 degrees to avoid triggering a TCAS TA. The host
would have to turn at least 12 degrees to avoid triggering a TCAS RA. A 10 second
response delay would add several degrees to these turn minima. Thus, relatively
significant avoidance maneuvers must be performed following an ACM PAZ alert in
order to prevent triggering TCAS TAs or RAs.
It is even more difficult to prevent TAs and RAs following a CAZ alert. In fact, in
this 500 kt opposite-direction example, a TCAS TA cannot be avoided without exceeding
an extreme maneuver (at least 30 degree bank angle and 60 degree heading change).
Figure 8.8 shows the TCAS alerting behavior following a response maneuver to a CAZ
alert. Avoiding an RA after a CAZ alert also requires an extreme maneuver. With a 30
degree bank angle, a 32 degree heading change is required without time delay, and 40
degree heading change is required if there is a five second delay.
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Figure 8.8 Effect of CAZ Avoidance Maneuver
on TCAS Alert Status (500 kt opposite direction)
Simulations were also performed for vertical maneuvers following ACM PAZ and
CAZ alerts. It was assumed that the aircraft performed a pull-up maneuver at a load
factor of 1.2 g to a given vertical rate. Table 8.1 shows the minimum climb rates that are
required under these conditions to avoid receiving a TCAS TA or RA alert. Climbs or
descents at approximately 400 ft/min are required to avoid a TA if action is started
immediately after a PAZ alert is issued. RAs are more easily avoided, with rates less than
100 ft/min required. After a CAZ alert, TAs cannot be avoided without a significantly
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more extreme maneuver (a load factor of approximately 2.4 g is required). RAs after a
CAZ alert could be avoided with vertical rates between approximately 600 and 900
ft/min depending on the response delay of the pilot and aircraft.
Table 8.1
Vertical Maneuver Requirements (ft/min)
to Avoid TCAS Alerts (1.2 g pull-up load factor)
0 second delay 10 second delay
TA RA TA RA
PAZ 380 70 450 80
ACM
alert
CAZ 600 900
8.3 Summary
In this chapter, conditions for dissonance have been identified by formally
describing the threshold functions of TCAS and ACM.
An analysis of the initial specifications for the ACM system in connection with
the current TCAS suggest that there may be operating conditions in which TCAS alerts
could occur without having first received ACM advisories. The simulations also show
that it may be difficult to avoid receiving a TCAS alert even after taking action in
response to an ACM alert in certain geometries. These may not be dissonance problems,
but need to be investigated further to determine the scope of encounters that may lead to
this type of behavior and to examine other human factors issues relating to this problem.
Potential solutions include modifying the ACM threshold parameters or ACM resolution
maneuvers (or both), or accepting that TCAS alerts may occur in certain geometries and
training pilots to understand why that dissonance exists and how it can be resolved.
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Sensor error may contribute more dissonance to that originating from the logic
difference, especially for pop-up situation, which will make it harder to avoiding
receiving a TCAS alert even after taking action in response to an ACM alert in certain
geometries. Due to differences in sensor information, another form of dissonance can
occur if TCAS rates one aircraft as a threat while ACM rates a different aircraft as a
threat.
Finally, some simplification of TCAS'and ACM was used to perform this initial
analysis. A more detailed study that includes factors such as communication and filtering
delays should be performed if higher-fidelity results are desired.
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9 Summary and Conclusions
The potential for conflicting information to be transmitted by different automated
alerting systems is growing as these systems become more pervasive in process
operations. Newly introduced alerting systems must be carefully designed to minimize
the potential for and impact of alerting conflicts (or dissonance), but little is currently
available to aid this process. The development of a model of alert dissonance would
therefore be beneficial in terms of providing both a theoretical foundation for
understanding conflicts and as a practical basis from which specific problems can be
addressed.
This thesis developed a methodology to model, analyze and mitigate conflicts
between multiple alerting systems. The methodology can be used to identify different
types of dissonance given two alerting systems, and also articulates the conditions that
must be true for each type of dissonance to occur. Based on the formal analysis of the
dissonance, several methods are described to address different problems caused by
different types of dissonance. The methodology is applied to two different processes
with multiple alerting systems to deal with different kinds of dissonance problems.
9.1 Summary
9.1.1 Category of Dissonance Situations
Based on a framework that facilitates articulating the specific information
elements that are sensed, processed, and displayed by each alerting system, and the
interactions between alerting systems, different types of dissonance are identified,
including how the dissonance is connected to differences in alert stage or resolution
command information. The alert stage specifies the level of threat according to the
alerting system.
Dissonance exists when the alert information suggests different threat level and/or
actions to resolve the hazard. Dissonance may not be perceived by the human operator
even if the dissonance is indicated between alerting systems, if the human operator
understands why the dissonance is indicated. Dissonance may be perceived even if there
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is no indicated dissonance at some time, the human operator can be influenced by other
factors, for instance, the dynamics of the process, other nominal information, human
mental model, etc.
9.1.2 Major Components Leading to Multiple Alerting Systems Dissonance
By drawing a mapping between process states and the resulting alert stages and
resolution commands, two major causes of dissonance are identified: the mapping itself
(different threshold functions or resolution logic) and the input (different observable state
caused by sensor error).
" When two systems are designed to protect against different hazards or
different time scales are used for the same hazard, threshold functions and
resolution logic are usually different in order to satisfy different
objectives. Thus, dissonance may perceived if the two systems are in
dissonant alert stages, the intersection of allowed action spaces by the
alerting systems is empty, or the trends of changes of this information is
different for the same process state.
" When two systems use different sensors to monitor the process, even if
they have the identical alerting thresholds or resolution logic, they may
still be dissonant due to sensor error.
9.1.3 Formal Method to Identify the Conditions for Dissonance
A mathematical method is developed to identify when or where the different types
of dissonance could occur in a given operation when there are logic differences between
two alerting systems. By exposing those situations that lead to dissonance, the system
design can be modified, operations can be changed, or the operators can be trained to
work around the dissonance.
By defining the alert stages as subsets of the whole state space, combinations of
alert stage subsets lead to space that may result in dissonance when two alerting systems
operate simultaneously. The boundaries of alert stage subsets (threshold functions) can
be defined by a set of predicates (or inequality statements) based on certain parameter
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values. The conditions for dissonance space can then be mathematically described as the
combination of true or false predicates.
9.1.4 Method to Analyze Dissonance Originating from Sensor Error
A formal method to analyze dissonance originating from sensor error is
developed. The contribution of sensor error to dissonance is identified through analyzing
the effect of sensor accuracy on the probability of dissonance, and is compared against
the contribution of logic differences to dissonance.
The mathematical analysis of the probability of dissonance for a given true state
or a set of trajectories helps to identify the contribution of sensor error to dissonance for a
given dynamic system. By defining the concepts of missed dissonance and false
dissonance, it is then possible to contrast the relative contribution of sensor error to
dissonance against the contribution of logic differences. This analysis may be used to
help the designer decide on the optimal sensor accuracy to minimize dissonance, or it
could be used to find the tradeoff between sensor accuracy and logic threshold
modifications to decrease the probability of dissonance.
9.1.5 Ways to Identify Dangerous Dissonance Space
A hybrid model is developed to accurately describe the dynamic behavior of the
process incorporating multiple alerting systems, in which the continuous and discrete
dynamics coexist and interact with each other. Using the hybrid model, dangerous
dissonance space is identified through backward reachability analysis.
The hybrid automation model developed in this thesis describes the evolution of a
collection of discrete and continuous variables as a sequence of continuous dynamics and
discrete transitions. While following continuous dynamics, discrete variables remain
constant and continuous variables evolve according to a vector field (like a usual control
system). At discrete transition times, both continuous and discrete variables change value
instantaneously, according to a transition function.
Transition functions model the human operator's response to alerting system
commands, including response delay and the discrete control being applied to the
process. So, transition functions on the boundaries of alert stage subset combinations act
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as a random processor, which randomly chooses a governing differential operator based
on some probability density function (PDF) of the allowed action space in that subset.
Crossing boundaries of these subsets drives the activation of transition functions.
Given the hazard space of the process, dangerous dissonance space can be
identified using backward reachability analysis with the hybrid model we developed. The
human operator's possible response in dangerous dissonance space could lead the process
to some hazard space. So, methodologies must be developed to at least avoid the
dangerous dissonance space.
9.1.6 Methods to Avoid or Mitigate Dissonance
Several ways to avoid or mitigate dissonance are suggested, including
prioritization, modification of system design, modification of operational procedures,
modification of control strategy, and modification of procedures under dissonance.
Mitigation methods should be chosen based on the advantages and disadvantages of each
method, specific performance requirements of each alerting system, and the different
types of dissonance that may be encountered.
* Alerting systems can be prioritized. If more than one alerting system is
triggered, the lower priority alerts may be inhibited or only displayed
passively. Prioritization is the simplest way to deal with dissonance and
can help reduce sensory and cognitive overload of the human during a
time of high stress. However, prioritization can reduce safety if two alerts
are both valid but the operator is only receiving or responding to one.
Also, it may be difficult to "undo" an earlier alert if a higher-priority
system acts later.
* It may be necessary to modify the design of the logic in the new (or
existing) alerting system to reduce the potential for dissonance as much as
possible. Different from prioritization, modification of system design
avoids dissonance or at least the dangerous effect of dissonance by
eliminating dissonance space (those subsets of the whole state space in
which dissonance occurs) or at least the dangerous dissonance space (part
of the dissonance space in which the human operator's possible response
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could lead the process to hazards). In general, the elimination of
dissonance space may compete with a system's other performance
requirements, and it may be hard to find a global optimal solution for this
multi-objective optimization problem.
It may be possible to modify operational procedures of the process so that
dissonance is unlikely to be triggered (through preventing the alert that
may cause dissonance with other alerts) as long as we know the conditions
for the dissonance. This is a way to avoid dissonance without changing
alerting system design or adding a filter to inhibit one or more alerting
systems. But the modification of operational procedures may largely
decrease the operating space of the whole process or induce other
workload on the operators.
* Modification of control strategy of alerting systems can be used to
mitigate dissonance when the dissonance is already exposed, if the
dissonance cannot be avoided through the previous methods. It could be
done either by modifying alerting system commands to avoid entering
dangerous dissonance space, or by restricting the control to avoid hazard
space once in dangerous dissonance space. But these control strategies
may be hard to implement or may not exist for some situations.
* A final way to mitigate dissonance is through modifying procedures under
dissonance. The operators may be trained to know the decision-making
logic of each alerting system, or they could be trained to take certain
control of the process once exposed to dissonance. Training alone will not
affect any system design. But dissonance may still exist if the logic or
sensor error differences result in situations different from the trained
situation, and training may fall short in more severe cases.
9.1.7 Application of the Framework
The methodology developed in this thesis is applied to analyze two different
processes with multiple alerting systems; each has different types of dissonance. These
examples serve to demonstrate the flexibility of the methodology.
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In-Trail Separation Example
Two different alerting systems are used to monitor an In-Trail separation process,
one for safety and the other for efficient operation. A region of dissonance space exists
due to an empty intersection of allowed action spaces (one system commands the
operator to accelerate while the second system commands a deceleration).
The mathematical method developed in Chapter 3 is used to identify the
conditions required for this dissonance to occure. The formal method developed in
Chapter 4 is used to analyze the dissonance originated from sensor error. Probability of
dissonance contours are computed for the whole state space given the sensor accuracy, so
that the probability of dissonance for any given true state can be viewed. An example
trajectory is examined to analyze the cumulative probability of dissonance, which
describes the overall opportunity to trigger dissonance for the given trajectory. Finally,
for a given example set of uncertain trajectories, the contribution of the sensor error to
dissonance is compared to the dissonance contributed by logic differences. It is observed
that there may be some benefit from sensor error to decreasing probability of dissonance
for some values of sensor accuracy. But this benefit may not be good for the overall
safety of the process.
The hybrid model developed in Chapter 5 is used to fully describe the hybrid
phenomenon of this In-Trail separation process. The dangerous dissonance space, which
is the largest part of the dissonance space in this example, is identified using backward
reachability analysis of the hybrid process.
The ways to avoid or mitigate dissonance suggested in Chapter 6 are outlined in
this example to demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of each method. The
optimal design of the threshold functions of two alerting systems are suggested in this
example, which may increase 5% of safety compared to the original design by decreasing
the percentage of trajectories entering dangerous dissonance space.
Air Traffic Separation Example
To demonstrate the application of the methodology to a real air traffic control
problem, the dissonance between two traffic alert and collision avoidance systems, the
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existing Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) vs. the proposed Airborne
Conflict Management (ACM), are modeled and analyzed.
An analysis of the initial specifications for the ACM system in connection with
the current TCAS suggest that there may be operating conditions in which TCAS alerts
could occur without having first received ACM advisories. The simulations also show
that it may be difficult to avoid receiving a TCAS alert even after taking reasonable
action in response to an ACM alert in certain geometries.
It was suggested by an RTCA subcommittee that ACM conflict resolution
advisories should allow the conflict to be resolved without triggering any TCAS
advisories (RTCA 2000). One means of trying to ensure this is to modify ACM-induced
maneuvers so that the likelihood of triggering a TCAS alert is small (modify alerting
system command to avoid dissonance).
A simulation was run for one encounter with two aircraft traveling in the opposite
direction, with each aircraft at 500 kt. Upon crossing the Protected Aerospace Zone
(PAZ) alert threshold, a given time delay was implemented, and then the host aircraft
performed a roll-in to a certain bank angle and rolled out at a given heading angle. The
simulation result shows that relatively significant avoidance maneuvers must be
performed following an ACM PAZ alert in order to prevent triggering TCAS Traffic
Advisories or Resolution Advisories. It is even more difficult to prevent a TCAS alert
following Collision Avoidance Zone (CAZ) alert. In fact, in this 500 kt opposite-
direction example, TCAS Traffic Advisories cannot be avoided without exceeding an
extreme maneuver (at least 30 degree bank angle and 60 degree heading change).
Simulations were also performed for vertical maneuvers following ACM alerts. It
was assumed that the aircraft performed a pull-up maneuver at a load factor of 1.2 g to a
given vertical rate. The simulation result shows that climbs or descents at approximately
400 ft/min are required to avoid a TCAS Traffic Advisory if action is started immediately
after a PAZ alert of ACM is issued. Resolution Advisories are more easily avoided, with
rates less than 100 ft/min required. After a CAZ alert from ACM, Traffic Advisories
cannot be avoided without a significantly more extreme maneuver (a load factor of
approximately 2.4 g is required). Resolution Advisories from TCAS after a CAZ alert of
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ACM could be avoided with vertical rates between approximately 600 and 900 ft/min
depending on the response delay of the pilot and aircraft.
9.2 Conclusions
The primary contributions of this thesis are discussed below.
1. A representation of the process with multiple alerting systems has been
generalized, including major components of each alerting system and interactions
between alerting systems. The representation has been used to identify the major
causes of dissonance and different types of dissonance between two given alerting
systems.
2. A mathematical method has been developed to identify when or where different
types of dissonance could occur in a given operation when there are logic
differences between two alerting systems. Given the conditions for dissonance,
the dissonance problems can be addressed practically.
3. A probabilistic analysis methodology has been developed to estimate the
probability of dissonance originating from sensor error. The methodology also
provides ways to compare the contribution of sensor error to dissonance against
the contribution of logic differences, through defining the concepts of missed
dissonance and false dissonance.
4. A hybrid model has been developed to fully describe the hybrid phenomenon in
the process with multiple alerting systems. The model has been used to identify
dangerous dissonance space through backward reachability analysis of the hybrid
process. Dangerous dissonance must be avoided or mitigated either through
modifying alerting system logic design or through modifying the control strategy
of the process. The model can also be used to identify other parts of dissonance
space with negative consequences, e.g., inefficient operation.
5. Five different methods to avoid or mitigate dissonance have been outlined. The
advantages and disadvantages of each method have been described. All these
methods have been applied in the In-Trail Separation example to demonstrate the
feasibility of each method.
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6. In the analysis of dissonance between two real traffic alert and collision avoidance
systems (the existing Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) vs.
the proposed Airborne Conflict Management (ACM)), the benefit to expose and
mitigate dissonance is shown using the methodology developed in this thesis.
Using the methodology, the conditions for dissonance where TCAS alerts occur
without having first received ACM advisories are identified, and dynamic
dissonance where a TCAS alert is triggered after taking action in response to an
ACM alert is determined for certain geometries. One of the suggested mitigation
methods, modifying the alerting system command to avoid dissonance, has been
recommended to avoid this dynamic dissonance.
9.3 Recommendations
Because of its generalized nature, the methodology developed in this thesis can be
applied to model and analyze the interactions between any decision support systems.
Advanced decision support systems that are currently under consideration in the
aerospace industry would benefit from this work. For example, the Center TRACON
Automation System (CTAS), which is being developed at the NASA Ames Research
Center, generates air traffic advisories designed to increase fuel efficiency, reduce delays,
and provide automation assistance to air traffic controllers. CTAS itself includes several
automation functions, all of which must be well integrated not only within CTAS itself,
but also with other ground-based systems and airborne systems. The methodology in this
thesis can be applied to determine interaction issues among automation functions within
CTAS, between CTAS and other ground-based systems, and between CTAS and airborne
decision support systems. The hybrid model developed in this thesis can be applied to
model CTAS functions, examine the dissonance space to verify the safety and
reachability specifications, and discover ways to optimize the CTAS design or
operational procedure to minimize potential dissonance.
In addition, the application of the methodology developed in this thesis is not
restricted to the aerospace industry; it can also be applied to automobiles, chemical and
power control stations, and medical monitoring systems, where automated alerting
systems are becoming increasingly pervasive.
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